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Lynda M. Collins* Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational
Equity in Global Environmental Governance
In the absence of binding international enforcement mechanisms, global
environmental governance must rely on a legal framework that has widespread
normative force around the world. In addition, such a framework should be
sufficiently detailed and pragmatic to allow for effective implementation, should
achieve the goal of environmental protection, and should be reasonable in terms
of the level of sacrifice expected of the present generation, particularly in the
developing world. It is argued that the comprehensive doctrine of intergenerational
equity is an effective and appropriate legal framework for global environmental
governance. The doctrine of intergenerational equity posits the present generation
of humans as simultaneously beneficiaries of the planetary legacy handed down
from past generations, and trustees of that legacy for the future. The doctrine
integrates the language of rights and responsibility and incorporates viable
implementation mechanisms. As a result, the doctrine of intergenerational equity
is superior to the presently hegemonic paradigm of sustainable development.
The author concludes that the international community should adopt the doctrine
of intergenerational equity as a framework for global environmental governance.
En l'absence de mdcanismes internationaux contraignants d'application des lois,
la gouvernance en matiere d'environnement doit reposer sur un cadre ldgislatif
qui a une force normative tres rdpandue dans le monde. Ce cadre devrait en
outre Ctre suffisamment dMtaill et pragmatique pour permettre la mise en oeuvre
efficace et pour permettre d'atteindre I'objectif de protection de I'environnement,
et il devrait 6tre raisonnable quant au niveau de sacrifices exigds de la gen6ration
actuelle, en particulier dans les pays en developpement. L'auteure de cet article
pretend que la doctrine de I'6quit6 intergendrationnelle est un cadre ldgislatif
efficace et appropri6 pour la regie environnementale mondiale. La doctrine
d'dquit6 intergdndrationnelle part de la notion que la gdneration actuelle est la fois
bendficiaire de I'hdritage plandtaire que lui ont laissd les generations precedentes
et fiduciaire de cet heritage pour les generations futures. La doctrine reprend le
langage des droits et des responsabilitds et englobe des mdcanismes viables
de mise en ceuvre. Par consequent, la doctrine d'6quit6 intergdndrationnelle est
sup6rieure I l'actuel paradigme h6gemonique de ddveloppement durable. En
conclusion, I'auteure affirme que la communaut6 internationale devrait adopter
la doctrine d'dquit6 intergdndrationnelle comme cadre d'action pour la rdgie
environnementale mondiale.
* Assistant Professor, University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section. The author
expresses her gratitude to Professors Natasha Affolder and Ian Townsend-Gault for their very helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article. Any errors or omissions are mine alone.
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Conclusion
I. Intergenerational equity: bridging the gap between rights and
responsibilities in global environmental governance
1. The international contest between rights and responsibilities-
Although human societies may be governed by diverse values such
as need, care, or love,' two dominant organizing principles are those
of rights and responsibility (the latter encompassing both duty and
obligation).2 Indeed, the reification of rights or responsibility is a defining
characteristic in many societies. In the West,3 "rights are the currency
of political and legal discourse."4 In contrast, "[duty] is the paradigm-
creating fundamental [concept] in Islamic, Jewish, Hindu, Christian,
I. See, e.g., Timothy Wichert, "A Mennonite Human Rights Paradigm?" in Duane K. Friesen &
Gerald W. Schlabach, eds., At Peace and Unafraid: Public Order, Security, and the Wisdom of the
Cross (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 2005) 331 at 331: "[for Mennonites], human rights language tends
to be a 'second language.' Their preferred language is that of compassion, care, and community." See
also Michael A. Santoro, "Human Rights and Human Needs: Diverse Moral Principles Justifying
Third World Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Drugs" (2006) 31 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 923 at
932-939.
2. See Jason Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the
International Human Rights Movement" (2005) 8 Yale Human Rts. & Dev. L.J. 67 at 74 [Morgan-
Foster, "Third Generation Rights"]. See also Leon Trakman & Sean Gatien, Rights andResponsibilities
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
3. I use the (admittedly vague) term "the West" herein to refer to the "industrialized democracies"
of Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. See Alex Y. Seita, "Globalization and the
Convergence of Values" (1997) 30 Cornell Int'l L. J. 429 at 469. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1997) at 46-47.
4. Trakman & Gatien, supra note 2. See also Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1990). Although there is a rich and voluminous literature on the discourse
of rights and responsibilities, I have chosen to rely substantially herein on the analysis of Trakman &
Gatien because it is, in my view, particularly useful in the environmental context.
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Confucian, and other cultures."'5 In the environmental context specifically,
responsibility towards nature is the dominant paradigm in the discourse of
ecological ethics,6 while the language of rights7 is increasingly invoked in
the realm of environmental advocacy.'
It is clear that any system of global environmental governance must
have legitimacy in both paradigms if it is to achieve widespread international
compliance and support. Moreover, a system that integrates both rights
and responsibility may be substantively more effective at achieving the
twin goals of environmental protection and sustainable development than
one based in either paradigm alone.9 Unfortunately, "[b]ecause the rights-
based perspective and the duties-based perspective form such deep-seated
paradigm-establishing assumptions in their respective legal cultures, it
is not easy to reconcile the two approaches into a universally acceptable
international theory."10
This article will explore the doctrine of intergenerational equity as
an integrative legal framework reconciling the two paradigms in'the area
of global environmental governance. Before proceeding further, it is
necessary to define the terms of the inquiry.
2. Definition of terms
Although the concepts of "rights," "duty," "obligation," and "responsibility"
are undoubtedly fluid and contextual," I will adopt the following definitions
for the purpose of facilitating an intelligible analysis:
Rights are "'interests' or 'benefits' secured for persons by rules
regulating relationships... A right-holder, X, has a right whenever the
protection or advancement of X's interest(s) is recognized as a reason for
imposing obligations...." 2 An "obligation" may be defined as "a moral or
legal requirement, duty,"' 3 while a duty is a "task or action that a person is
5. Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra note 2 at 74.
6. Klaus Bosselmann, "Human Rights and the Environment: Redefining Fundamental Principles?"
in Brendan Gleeson & Nicholas Low, eds., Governing for the Environment (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2001) 118 at 126.
7. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1977) at 184.
8. See Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant, eds., Linking Human Rights and the Environment
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003); Sumudu Atapattu, "The Right to a Healthy Life or
the Right to Die Polluted?: The Emergence of a Human Right to a Healthy Environment Under
International Law' (2002) 16 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 65; Adriana Fabra Aguilar, "Enforcing the Right to a
Healthy Environment in Latin America" (1994) 3 R.E.C.I.E.L. 215.
9. See Trakman & .Gatien, supra note 2 at 215.
10. Ibid. at 102.
11. See, e.g., Ben Saul, "In the Shadow of Human Rights: Human Duties, Obligations, and
Responsibilities" (2001) 32 Colum. H.R. L. Rev. 565 at 587-588.
12. Trakman & Gatien, supra note 2 at 3, n. 3.
13. Saul, supra note I I at 581-582.
Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity 83
in Global Environmental Governance
bound to perform for moral or legal' reasons."' 4 This article is concerned
primarily with legal rights, obligations, duties, and responsibilities (i.e.,
those created and/or maintained by law).
Responsibility is related to, but distinct from, duty and obligation.
Feinberg asserts that "[a] responsibility, like a duty, is both a burden and
a liability; but unlike a duty it carries considerable discretion (sometimes
called 'authority') along with it .... [A] goal is assigned and the means
of achieving it are left to the independent judgment of the responsible
party.""5 Trakman and Gatien also view responsibility as distinct from
duty and obligation:
[A] duty is an obligation correlative to a right. Duties [are] external limits
on rights because A's duties are generated by B's rights. Responsibilities
are [also]... correlative to rights but are not conceived of as external limits
upon them. A's rights, not B's rights, generate responsibilities for A.1 6
[Further], [a] responsibility is generated when an important interest,
not protected by countervailing rights or state action, is or would be
detrimentally affected by the exercise of a right. 7
Two important observations may be made concerning this formulation of
responsibility. First, in Trakman and Gatien's theory, responsibility may
be seen as a kind of "gap filler," arising in the situation where no duty or
obligation exists. Second, responsibility in this formulation is integrated
with the definition of the right; it alters the nature of the right from within,
and originates with the right-holder's moral agency.'" In the environmental
context, I concur with the second proposition, and disagree with the first.
In my view, in the area of global environmental governance at least,
it is most helpful to conceptualize responsibility as a broad overarching
category that encompasses and overlaps with, but also extends beyond,
the sub-categories of duty and obligation. In this formulation, although
responsibility does perform a gap-filling function when no duty or
obligation applies, it may also co-exist with a duty and/or obligation. In
other words, some responsibilities will also be duties and/or obligations,
while others will not. The exercise of a right will in many cases be subject
to both internal (responsibility) and external (duty) limitations.
14. Ibid at581.
15. Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds ofLiberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980) at 137, cited in Saul, supra note 11 at 582.
16. Trakman & Gatien, supra note 2 at 63, n. 43.
17. Ibid. at 10 [emphasis added].
18. See Trakman & Gatien, supra note 2 at 252-253 asserting that this model "reconstitutes" rights,
to "reflect this reality: rights are not free. They come with responsibilities." [emphasis in original]. .
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Although I differ with Trakman and Gatien in adopting this broad
definition of responsibility, I concur with their assertion that a responsibility
should be seen as an internal limitation on a right. This "internal limit"
model is particularly appropriate in the environmental context. It seems
likely that an ex ante integration of rights with environmental responsibility
will militate in favour of an ethic of precaution and sustainability. In
contrast, the rights-duty equation, in which a right holder begins from a
place of freedom and latitude in exercising the right, until and unless it
collides with the right(s) of another, is more consistent with an ethic of
consumption, with competing rights being addressed through mitigation
(at best) or even outright opposition. 19
Any proposal for rights reform at the global level faces the challenge
of rights entrenchment in the West. As we will see, the version of rights
theory that has evolved with Western liberalism is particularly absolutist,
leaving little room for the discourse of responsibility. This theory, in
which rights tend to supersede all other values, has been institutionalized
and exported at the international level through international human rights
law.
3. The preeminence of rights in the West
The hegemony of rights is a relatively new phenomenon in the history
of Western thought. As Morgan-Foster explains, foundational Western
thinkers including Aristotle,2" Thomas Aquinas, and Niccolo Machiavelli
all emphasized the centrality of individual duty to the community, the
republic, and/or the divine.2 ' Indeed, duty (to the church, to the feudal
lord, to the husband/fath6r) was a central organizing principle in pre-
modern Europe.2
2
Enlightenment philosophers including Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679),
John Locke (1632-1704) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) first
posited the autonomous individual as a key player in Western political
19. See Trakman & Gatien, supra note 2 at 248 noting that the rights-duty ("external limit") model
requires several conditions to be met before it can result in environmental protection:
(1) There must be a subject willing to assert a right to protect the environment against the harmful
exercise of a right by a state or other right-holder. (2) That subject's right must prevail [or] (3)
There must be some non-correlative duty that would limit the harm caused by the exercise of
that [first right-holder's] right.
Trakman and Gatien argue persuasively that these conditions are frequently absent, with the result that
the traditional rights-duty equation is inadequate to achieve environmental protection.
20. Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra note 2 at 76-79.
21. Ibid. See also David Selboume, The Principle of Duty: An Essay on the Foundations of the Civic
Order (Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001) at 100.
22. See Saul, supra note I I at 608.
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theory. 23 The theory of the social contract, conceived by Hobbes and
developed by Locke and Rousseau, took the then radical position that the
individual (male) begins as a free and equal being with the right to live
his life according to his own will.24 The theory postulates that society, or
the State, is formed when an aggregate of (male) individuals voluntarily
consent to delegate their freedom to the collective for the purpose of
maximizing their individual welfare. 25 The claims of the Enlightenment
philosophers became the basis for liberalism, 26 and set the stage for the rise
of rights and individualism in the West.
However, contemporary liberals' emphasis on individual rights as
the preeminent political value is a deviation from early liberal theory.
Indeed,
[e]arly liberals were very conscious of the individual's connections
with a wider community, nation, history, language, literature, custom,
and tradition. John Stuart Mill wrote that "[t]he contented man, or the
contented family, who have no ambition ... to promote the good of
their country or their neighbourhood... excite in us neither admiration
nor approval." The very idea of Rousseau's social contract presupposed
reciprocal rights and responsibilities, and "assumed a considerable
degree of communal coherence, and the existence of a social ethic of
public responsibility, as part of the heritage of feudal society."27
Although Western liberalism had the historical and theoretical potential to
recognize the importance of both rights and responsibility, contemporary
Western thought operates on a clear hierarchy in which rights reign
supreme. Thus, Dworkin has written that "[t]he language of rights now
dominates political debate in the United States."28 Selbourne, for his part,
argues that:
[t]he notion... of the need for reciprocity or "balance" between rights and
duties has survived in the corrupted liberal order, despite the attenuation
of the principle of duty in practice, but in a mutant and a-civic form:
under the rule of dutiless right and demand-satisfaction, the citizen-
turned-stranger insists upon his dutiless or absolute rights as citizen, or
23. See generally David Boucher & Paul Kelly, eds., The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls
(London: Routledge, 1994).
24. Ibid. For concise summaries of social contract theories, see also April L. Cherry, "Social
Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the Male Sex-Right" (1996) 75 Or. L. Rev. 1037 at 1044-
1055; Liliya Abramchayev, "A Social Contract Argument for the State's Duty to Protect from Private
Violence" (2004) 18 St.John's J. Legal Comment. 849 at 849-853.
25. Ibid.
26. See generally J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
27. Saul, supra note 11 at 584 [footnotes omitted].
28. Dworkin, supra note 7 at 184.
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ostensible citizen, on'the one hand and upon the rightless duties to him of
the civic order, or of its instrument the state, on the other.29
Despite these concerns, the Western notion of preeminent rights has been
incorporated into international law, through the construct of "human
rights."
Contemporary human rights law is based philosophically in the
Western traditions of natural law/natural rights and Enlightenment notions
of the contingency of state legitimacy on respect for certain irreducible
individual rights.30 Historically, the creation of the foundational human
rights documents came as a response to the abuses of the European nation-
states and, most particularly, the atrocities of Nazi Germany.3 Although
human rights law, like rights theory more generally, could have maintained
a reciprocal recognition of responsibility, it has largely failed to do so.
Thus, Morgan-Foster writes that "[i]n human rights law, rights are
explicit, while corresponding duties are implicit, controversial, and poorly
theorized." 3 2 Although a number of important human rights instruments
do contain references to duty and/or responsibility,33 it cannot seriously be
questioned that rights remain hegemonic in the field.3 4 Indeed, the human
rights paradigm has arguably marginalized duty intentionally, viewing
duty as antithetical to the rights of the individual. Saul explains:
In the West, the history of the human rights movement is, in part, a
history of struggle.. .against the millstones of duty and obligation to the
church; feudal lords and nobles; the monarch; the revolutionary, imperial,
nationalist, fascist, or communist State; and to the husband and family.
Over many centuries in Europe, these.. .institutions... commanded and
29. Selbourne, supra note 21 at 188-89, quoted in Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra
note 2 at 84 [emphasis in original].
30. See Robert D. Sloane, "Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of
International Human Rights" (2001) 34 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 527 at 541-543.
31. Note, however, that there were relevant precedents in existing international law. In particular,
Steiner and Alston argue that human rights law was related to international humanitarian law (the
laws of war), international law governing state treatment of aliens, and the regime of minority rights
protection developed under the League of Nations. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International
Human Rights in Context: law, politics, morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) at 26 ff. The
prohibition of slavery was also an important precedent for international human-rights law. See Makau
Mutua, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: the Metaphor of Human Rights" (2001) 42 Harv. Int'l L.J. 201
at 205 [Mutua, "Metaphor"].
32. Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra note 2 at 68.
33. See Saul, supra note 11.
34. The one notable exception, the African Charter on Human and Peoples'Rights, 27 June 1981,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) [African Charter], has been
criticized for its attempt to integrate rights and duty/responsibility. See generally Makau Wa Mutua,
."The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties"
(1995) 35 Va. J. Int'l L. 339 [Mutua, "Banjul Charter"].
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enforced loyalty, allegiance, and obedience from their subjects, who
were duty-bound by morality or law to fulfill numerous, often onerous
social obligations."
Whether or not rights supremacy is appropriate in light of Western history,
the export of a human rights paradigm arising out of the specific culture
and history of the West has provoked sustained criticism from the non-
Western world.
4. Challenges to the human rights paradigm
There is a rich and voluminous literature analyzing the merits and pitfalls
of human rights law and discourse, and a fulsome evaluation of this
question is beyond the scope of this article. I will not attempt to resolve
the conflict between rights and responsibility as it has been articulated in
critiques (and defenses) of human rights law.36 However, I will introduce
the key schools of human rights critique that are relevant to our inquiry, in
* order to situate the doctrine of intergenerational equity in its political and
legal context.
a. Cultural relativist challenges to the human rights paradigm
States and scholars .outside the West have criticized the international
human rights regime as a Western imperialist project. Some strong cultural
relativists dispute the existence of any inherent, "pre-social" human rights
independent of cultural values. 37 In this view, international human rights
law is seen as yet another colonialist "civilizing mission" in which the West
- claiming access to absolute, transcendent Truth - attempts to impose
its own culturally specific values on non-Western peoples.38 Moderate
cultural relativists, on the other hand, recognize the reality and validity of
cultural difference, but still endorse the existence of an irreducible core of
universal human rights. 3
9
35. Saul, supra note 11 at 608.
36. Ultimately, I will argue that the doctrine of intergenerational equity avoids (rather than resolves)
the contest between rights and responsibilities by creating a site of reconciliation for the two paradigms
in global environmental governance.
37. For a summary and critique of this claim see Guyora Binder, "Cultural Relativism and Cultural
Imperialism in Human Rights Law" (1999) 5 Buff. H.R. L. Rev. 211 at 214 ff.
38. See, e.g., Mutua, "Metaphor," supra note 31 at 210: "the human rights movement-is located
within the historical continuum of Eurocentrism as a civilizing mission, and therefore as an attack
on non-European cultures...". See also David P. Fidler, "The Return of the Standard of Civilization"
(2001) 2 Chicago J. Int'l L. 137 at 139.
39. See Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra note 2 at 70 and, by the same author, "A
New Perspective on the Universality Debate: Reverse Moderate Relativism in the Islamic Context"
(2003) 10 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 35 [Morgan-Foster, "New Perspective']. See also Dianne Otto,
"Rethinking the 'Universality' of Human Rights Law" (1997) 29 Colum. H.R. L. Rev. I.
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As the Westem-derived system of human rights has been applied.
worldwide over the past six decades, cross-cultural criticism has become
crucially important, both because of the imperative of attaining cultural
credibility in diverse settings, and because of the intellectual cross-
fertilization available from non-Western schools of thought.40 The relativist
critique has challenged a number of culturally specific and potentially
problematic aspects of Western liberalism, notably the primacy of the
individual, a belief in the inherent superiority of democratic systems of
governance, and the prioritization of rights over responsibility.4'
b.. Instrumentalist challenges to the human rights paradigm
In addition to concerns regarding cultural imperialism, a number of
commentators both within and outside the West have asserted that human
rights are simply ineffective - or even counterproductive - at maximizing
human welfare in important areas. Critics from both the left and the right
argue that the disproportionate emphasis on rights in Western society has had
a negative impact on social relations and human happiness. The argument
is that the rights paradigm "emphasizes a selfish separateness rather than
the connections that make communal life possible and fulfilling.
' 42
Others assert that the interests underlying certain kinds of rights are
actually best protected through the mechanism of duty or obligation, rather
than rights. Robert Cover, for example, asserts that the disproportionate
emphasis on rights is unproductive because while the individualistic rights
paradigm is well-suited to protecting certain kinds of interests (e.g., those
pertaining to equality and political participation 43),
[t]he jurisprudence of rights has proved singularly weak in providing for
the material guarantees of life and dignity flowing from the community
to the individual. While we may talk of the right to medical care, the
right to subsistence, the right to an education, we are constantly met
by the realization that such rhetorical tropes are empty in a way that
the right to freedom of expression or the right to due process are not.
When the issue is restraint upon power it is intelligible to simply state the
principle of restraint...The intelligibility of the principle remains because
it is always clear who is being addressed - whoever it is that acts to
threaten the right in question. However, the "right to an education" is not
even an intelligible principle unless we know to whom it is addressed.
40. Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra note 2 at 67-68.
41. See Sloane, supra note 30 at 540.
42. Philippa Strum, "Rights, Responsibilities, and the Social Contract" in Kenneth W. Hunter &
Timothy C. Mack, eds., International Rights and Responsibilities for the Future (Westport, CT.:
Praeger, 1996) 29 at 29.
43. Robert M. Cover, "Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order" (1987) 5 J.L. &
Religion 65 at 73.
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Taken alone it only speaks to a need. A distributional premise is missing
which can only be supplied through a principle of "obligation."'
Environmental protection is certainly a "material guarantee of life and
dignity flowing from the community to the individual." Thus, if Cover is
correct, then the rights paradigm alone is likely inadequate to the task of
ensuring global environmental protection.
Ecological ethicists share this suspicion of the capacity for rights to
benefit the environment.
c. Ecological challenges to the human rights paradigm
Ecological ethics challenges the human rights paradigm on two primary
bases. First, the human rights paradigm is, by definition, inherently
anthropocentric. A human rights approach reinforces notions of human
separation from nature, and even superiority over the rest of the ecological
community.45 The concern here is that viewing environmental protection
through the lens of human rights "subjugates all other needs, interests and
values of nature to those of humanity,"" contravening the Deep Ecology
notion of "biospherical egalitarianism. '47  Concern with the equality
of human and non-human members of the natural world is a central
preoccupation of ecological ethics. It is not limited to the Deep Ecology
movement, and in fact was expressed by formative thinkers in the field
of ecological ethics, including such icons as Aldo Leopold48 and Rachel
Carson. 49 Thus, the literature of ecological ethics, when it addresses rights
44. Ibid. at 71.
45. See Prudence E. Taylor, "From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in
International Law?" (1998) 10 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 309 at 352.
46. Ibid.
47. See Louis P. Pojman, ed., Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application, 3rd ed.
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001) at 147.
48. Leopold perceived humans and non-humans as equal members in the ecological community, and
argued that the land ethic would serve to change the role of humans from that of conqueror to that of
citizen in the land community. See Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac: And Sketches Here and
There (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949) at 224-225.
49. Carson lamented that:
[Humans] still talk in terms of conquest. We still haven't become mature enough to think of
ourselves as only a tiny part of a vast and incredible universe. Man's attitude toward nature
is today critically important simply because we have now acquired a fateful power to alter
and destroy nature. But man is a part of nature, and his war against nature is inevitably a
war against himself.
See Rachel Carson, "Obituary April 15, 1964" online: <http://www.rachelcarson.org/ index.
cfm?v l=Memoriam>.
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at all, tends to focus on the rights of nature and corresponding human
duties.5 0
Second, and closely related to challenges targeting the "human"
component of human rights, ecological ethicists are also suspicious of.
"rights" per se. Shiva, for example, asserts that:
[t]he separation of rights and responsibility is at the root of ecological
devastation and gender and class inequality. Corporations that earn
profits from the chemical industry, or from genetic pollution resulting
from genetically engineered crops, do not have to bear the burden of that
pollution. The social and ecological costs are externalised and borne by
others who are excluded from decisions and from benefits. 1
Hence, ecological ethicists tend to see the rights construct as part of the
environmental problem, rather than the solution.
5. The emergence of environmental human rights
Despite the significant concerns of ecological ethicists regarding the
subjugation of responsibility to rights, and the ongoing international
controversy regarding the legitimacy of human rights law itself, the
existence of urgent environmental threats to physical and cultural
survival has provoked a movement towards a human rights approach to
environmental predicaments. Scholars and advocates have attempted
to secure environmental protection through the mobilization of existing
human rights to address environmental harm, and the creation or
codification of new environmental human rights, including both procedural
and substantive components.12
With respect to the first category, tribunals at the domestic, regional
and international levels have found that environmental degradation may
violate existing human rights. Indeed, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the
European Court of Human Rights have all recognized actual or potential
50. Leopold, for example, exhorted humans to respect the "biotic right" of non-human organisms
to exist. See Leopold, supra note 48 at 211. Deep Ecology, for its part, emphasizes the intrinsic value
of nature, and the corresponding human duty to respect living beings' "right to live and flourish." See
Ame Naess, "Ecosophy T: Deep Versus Shallow Ecology" in Pojman, supra note 47 at 152. Outside
the Deep Ecology movement, Professor Christopher Stone advocated for the legal rights of natural
objects in his famous 1972 article, "Should Trees Have Standing?" See Christopher D. Stone, "Should
Trees Have Standing? -Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects" (1972)45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450.
51. Vandana Shiva, "Paradigm Shift: Rebuilding true security in an age of insecurity" (2002)
Resurgence, Issue 214, online: <http://www.resurgence.org/resurgence/ issues/shiva214.htm>.
52. Cf Dinah Shelton, "Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment (1991)
28 Stan. J. Int'l L. 103 [Shelton, "Right to Environment"].
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violations of the right to life through environmental harm.53 Domestic
tribunals in India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and several Latin American
countries have also found violations of domestic constitutional rights to
rights to life and/or health through environmental harm. 4 Scholars and
jurists have similarly held that environmental harm may violate existing
human rights to privacy and family life,55 property,56 suitable working
conditions,57 adequate standard of living, 8 and/or culture. 9
Procedural environmental rights, including access to environmental
information, participation in environmental decision-making, and access
to justice for environmental wrongs, have been enshrined in a number
of significant soft law instruments and in two binding international
Conventions.60 The World Charter for Nature,6 1 Agenda 21,62 and the Rio
Declaration on Environment andDevelopment,63 for example, all recognize
procedural environmental rights. In the area of binding international
law, the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making, andAccess to Justice in Environmental
53. See EHP v. Canada, Communication No. 67/1980, in UnitedNations, Selected Decisions of The
Human Rights Committee Under The Optional Protocol, vol. 2, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) 20
(recognizing that the threat posed by storage of nuclear waste raises serious concerns regarding the
right to life); Yanomami Indians v. Brazil, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 761'5, OEA/Ser.L V/11/66 doe. 10 rev.
1 (1985) (finding violations of the Yanomami people's rights to life, liberty and personal security
through serious damage to the environment in which they lived); Oneryildiz v. Turkey, 48939/99
[2004] ECHR 657 (30 November 2004) (finding a violation of the right to life where the state failed to
prevent a foreseeable methane explosion in a municipal waste disposal site).
54. See Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, "Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under
International Law? It Depends on the Source" (2001) 12 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 1 at 18-20;
Atapattu, supra note 8 at 108.
55. , See Atapattu, ibid. at 102-03.
56. See Romina Picolotti & Jorge Daniel Taillant, supra note 8 at xiv (Introduction).
57. Shelton, "Right to Environment," supra note 52 at 112.
58. Ibid.
59. See Dinah Shelton, "The Environmental Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals"
in Picolotti & Taillant, supra note 56, 1 at 19.
60. See Shelton, "Right to Environment," supra note 52 at 117. Shelton and a number of later
commentators use the term "environmental rights" to refer to these procedural entitlements. See, e.g.,
Atapattu, supra note 8 at 72. I find the use of the facially broad term "environmental rights" to refer
to rights that are strictly procedural in nature unduly confusing.
61. World Charterfor Nature, GA Res. 37/7, UN GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, UN Doe. A/37/51
(1982).
62. UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, Agenda
21, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., UN Doe A/CONF. 151/26 Vol. 111 (1992) s. 23.2, online: <http://www.
un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda2 l/english/agenda21 toc.htm> [Agenda 21].
63. Report of the UN Conference on Environment andDevelopment, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June1992,
UN Division for Sustainable Development, 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. I), Annex 1, online:
<http://www.un.org/doeuments/ga/confl 5 l/aconfl 5126- lannex I.htm>.
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Matters (the "Aarhus Convention"),64 and numerous other multi-lateral
and bilateral treaties65 provide for procedural environmental rights.
The third approach to environmental human rights is the articulation
of a substantive "right to environment," independent of pre-existing
human rights. A right to environment (variously modified as "healthy,"
"safe," "adequate," etc.) 66 has been widely recognized in international
soft law instruments, including such. pivotal documents as the Stockholm
Declaration on the Human Environment,67 and the 1989 Hague Declaration
on the Environment.68 Beyond the realm of soft law, two binding regional
instruments include a human right to environment-the African Charter on
Human and Peoples 'Rights69 and the Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the area of Economic Social and Cultural
Rights (the Protocol of San Salvador).7" Further, there is growing evidence
of state action and opinio juris giving rise to a right to environment as a
matter of customary international law.7 Most significantly, a majority of
domestic constitutions enacted since 1970 recognize some kind of right to
environment.
72
64. See Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access
to Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, online: UNECE <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/
documents/cep43e.pdf>, 38 I.L.M. 517 (1999) [Aarhus Convention]. The Aarhus Convention has been
ratified by twenty-seven states as well as the European Union. See "Aarhus Convention ratified by the
European Community," online: United Nations in Belarus <http://un.by/en/news/world/2005/28-02-
05-04.html>.
65. Alexandre Kiss, "The Right to the Conservation of the Environment" in Picolotti & Taillant,
supra note 8, 31 at 37-38. At the national level, sixteen countries have constitutional provisions
recognizing the right to environmental information.
66. See Michael Burger, "Bi-Polar and Polycentric Approaches to Human Rights and the
Environment" (2003) 28 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 371 at 376.
67. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, UN Doc. AICONF.48/14/
Rev.l, 11 I.L.M. 1416 [Stockholm Declaration], Principle 1.
68. Hague Declaration on the Environment, 11 March 1989, 28 .L.M 1308.
69. African Charter, supra note 34 Article 24: "[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a general
satisfactory environment favourable to their development." There are more than fifty states party to
the Charter, which entered into force on October 21, 1986. See African Commission on Human and
Peoples' Rights, online: <http://www.achpr.orgt>.
70. 17 November 1988, O.A.S.T.S. 69, Article 11 (recognizing the right to a healthy environment and
requiring States Parties to promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment).
The Protocol of San Salvador entered into force on November 16, 1999, and thirteen states have now
ratified or acceded to it. See "Office of International Law: Multilateral Treaties," online: Organization
of American States <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-52.html>.
71. See generally John Lee, "The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right
to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law" (2000) 25 Colum. J. Envtl.
L. at 291-292; Rodriguez-Rivera, supra note 54; and Lynda M. Collins, "Are We There Yet? The Right
to Environment in International and European Law" (copy on file with author).
72. See Rosaleen O'Gara et al., Environmental Rights Report 2007: Human Rights and the
Environment (Oakland, CA: Earthjustice, 2007) at 126-147.
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In sum, it is clear that environmental human rights (in their
various instantiations) have become firmly entrenched in international
environmental law and policy. As a result, what is required is a counter-
balancing of rights with responsibility in the realm of environment. The
doctrine ofintergenerational equity is an effective vehicle for accomplishing
this balancing.
6. The doctrine of intergenerational equity - balancing rights and
responsibility
The doctrine of intergenerational equity is a comprehensive policy and legal
framework for global environmental governance developed by Professor
Edith Brown Weiss in her 1989 book, In Fairness to Future Generations.73
Intergenerational equity as articulated by Brown Weiss integrates rights
and responsibility even more profoundly than the "internal limitation"
theory discussed above. Brown Weiss integrates rights and responsibility
at the level of moral/legal identity. She posits the present generation of
humans as both beneficiaries of a planetary legacy passed down from the
past and as trustees of the planetary legacy for future generations.74 The
doctrine recognizes the rights of the present generation to use and enjoy
ecological resources and also its obligation to adequately conserve such
resources for the future.75 It validates both the interest of the individual
in an adequate quality of life and the value of the inter-temporal world
community in which every individual is situated.
The central claim of this Article is that the doctrine of intergenerational
equity integrates the paradigms of rights and responsibilities, transcends
the limitations of each paradigm taken separately, and has the potential to
function as a universally acceptable framework for global environmental
governance. I will further argue that the presently dominant paiadigm
of international environmental decision-making, that of sustainable
development,76 is inadequate with respect to the protection of future
generations. The sustainable development paradigm eschews the language
of both rights and responsibility, lacks any mechanism for effective
implementation, and is highly ambiguous as a policy framework. As a
result, a return 'to the rigorous, content-rich, and pragmatic doctrine of
intergenerational equity is sorely needed.
73. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony,
and Intergenerational Equity (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1989) [Brown Weiss, Future
Generations].
74. Ibid. at 20.
75. Ibid.
76. See Part 11. 1 below.
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Part II will introduce the doctrine of intergenerational equity as
developed by Brown Weiss in In Fairness to Future Generations.77 I
will describe the normative premises underlying the doctrine of
intergenerational equity, the central components of the doctrine, and the
major critiques of Brown Weiss's theory. Part III will examine the current
legal status of intergenerational equity in international law, including
the relationship between intergenerational equity and other emergent
principles of international environmental law (in particular sustainable
development, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, and the right
to environment). A brief conclusion will follow. I hope to demonstrate
throughout that the doctrine of intergenerational equity is a site of
reconciliation of rights and responsibility, and a useful legal and policy
framework in global environmental governance.
II. The doctrine of intergenerational equity
1. Introduction
a. Historical antecedents and cross-cultural analogues
Throughout history, human societies have been concerned with the welfare
of future generations. At a minimum, concern with the well-being of
one's own progeny is a core evolutionary characteristic "hard-wired" into
human (and non-human) organisms." A broader concept of obligation
towards future generations more generally also forms part of ethical and
legal systems in diverse cultures around the world. Islamic law is perhaps
most consistent with contemporary notions of intergenerational equity,
conceptualizing Muslims as stewards and trustees of the natural world
with duties towards both current and future generations.7 9 Similarly, both
77. Supra note 73.
78. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, rev. ed. By Philip Appleman (New York: Norton, 1975)
at 50, cited in Jack B. Weinstein, "Why Protect the Environment for Others?" (2003) 77 St. John's L.
Rev. 217 at 222; Shorge Sato, "Sustainable Development and the Selfish Gene: A Rational Paradigm
for Achieving Intergenerational Equity" (2003) 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 503 at 520-521. Philosopher
Avner de-Shalit suggests that apart from the genetic drive to care for future generations, humans have
an innate psychological tendency to do so, as part of the broader phenomenon of "self-transcendence":
"One's notion of one's identity extends into the future, including those times subsequent to one's
death." Avner de-Shalit, Why Posterity Matters (London: Routledge, 1995) at 34. For the idea of "self-
transcendence" de-Shalit cites Ernest Partridge, "Why care about the future?" in Ernest Partridge, ed.,
Responsibilities to Future Generations (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981) 203 at 204.
79. See Azim Nanji, "The Right to Development: Social and Cultural Rights and Duties to the
Community" in Proceedings of the Seminar on Islamic Perspectives on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, UN Doe. HR/IP/SEM/1999/1 (PART II Sec. 2), (1999) at 346. Citing Qur'anic ayah
2:30, Nanji discusses "the concept of custodial trusteeship, expressed in the Qur'an through the notion
of the individual's role as khalifah-stewardship-and hence accountability for the way in which such
a role is undertaken for the betterment of society, and for future generations." This passage of Nanji is
quoted by Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra note 2 at 106.
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Judaism and Christianity include notions of collective human ownership
of the natural world, entailing environmental stewardship obligations to
future generations."0
Streams of African customary law also include a notion of ownership/
stewardship of land by the collective, including future generations. One
Ghanaian chief has explained that in this conceptualization, "land belongs
to a vast family of whom many are dead, a few are living, and [a] countless
host are still unborn."'" Asian philosophical and religious traditions also
include notions -of responsibility to future generations, 2 which in some
cases are thought to include reincarnations of those currently living. 3
Similarly, in what is now known as North America, Haudenosaunee (or
Iroquois) law explicitly requires decision-makers to take into account
impacts extending seven generations into the future. 84
In the West, the civil law tradition in Germany explicitly subjects
property ownership to social obligations arguably encompassing an
inter-temporal dimension,85 while Marxism conceptualizes the present
generation as mere users, rather than owners, of the land, with a duty to
pass it on in good condition.8 6 Even the American constitutional tradition
included recognition of duties to future generations. James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson debated the issue of duties to future generations in a
famous series of letters, with Jefferson arguing that passing on debt to future
generations was an improper form of taxation without represrntation, 7
80. See David Rosen, "Judaism and Ecology" and Emmanuel Agius, "The Earth Belongs to All
Generations: Moral Challenges of Sustainable Development" in Emmanuel Agius & Lionel Chircop,
eds., Caring for Future Generations: Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Perspectives (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 1998) at 62 and 103 respectively. Agius cites Genesis 17: 7-8: "I will maintain my Covenant
between Me and you, and your offspring to come... I give the land you sojourn in to you and your
offspring to come, all the land ... as an everlasting possession."
8 1. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 20.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid. See also John M. Peek, "Buddhism, Human Rights and the Japanese State" (1995) 17:3
Hum. Rts. Q. 527 at 530: "the [Buddhist] theory of dependent origination argues that the existence of
each of us is to a significant degree dependent on those who preceded us and those that share this world
with us, and that in a like manner those yet to be born are dependent on all those that preceded them.
A more forceful reminder of our gratitude to previous generations and of our responsibilities to future
generations is hard to come by." See also The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, My 7ibet (London: Thames &
Hudson, 1990) at 79-80.
84. The Great Law of Peace (Gayanashagowa), Part 28. See White Roots of Peace, The Great Law
of Peace of the Longhouse People (Rooseveltown, NY: White Roots of Peace, Mohawk Nation of
Akwesasne, 1973).
85. See R. Dolzer, Property and Environment: The Social Obligation Inherent in Ownership (Ottawa:
1UCN, 1976) cited in Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 19, n. 11.
86. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 20.
87. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (4 February 1790), in James Morton Smith, ed.,
The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776-
1826 (New York: Norton, 1995) at 634.
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and Madison conceding that it is "indispensable in adjusting the account
between the dead and the living ... that the debits against the latter do not
exceed the advances made by the former."88
Thus, some notion of responsibility towards future generations can
be found in diverse religious, cultural, and political traditions around the
world.
b. The ascendance of the present
Despite the widespread cultural legacy of intergenerational thinking,
contemporary legal and political systems in many areas have largely failed
to give effect to this tradition of intergenerational concern. In democratic
societies throughout the world, the politician's desire for re-election
has privileged short-term thinking in environmental decision-making.89
Indeed, "[i]n politics, [the concept of] long-term often does not seem to
go beyond the next election."9 Environmental regulators, in turn, ensure
the preeminence of the present through the use of time "discounting" in
cost-benefit analysis. 91
Legal doctrine in many areas also systematically excludes the interests
of the future. Consider, for example, how Western property law treats a
landowner who harms her own land (thus depriving future generations of
its benefits):
What about the landowner who ruins his own land, eroding its soil or
polluting its waters? This we ignore; for where, we ask, is the harm? Not
many generations ago the answer would have been obvious: the harm
is to the landowner's community, to the land itself, and to the future
generations that will live there. But so far has community fallen in
our thinking, so self-centered have we become, that today this answer is
rarely voiced. Perhaps it is rarely imagined.92
The notion of the landowner's freedom (which is subject only to the rights
of other existing landowners) is reflected in classical international law in
the principle that states generally have a sovereign right to exploit their own
88. Ibid at 651.
89. See, e.g., Jbrg Chet Tremmel & Martin Viehover, "The Dilemma of Short-Term Politics" (2002)
3 Intergenerational Justice Review 12 at 12: "The need to appease the electorate in regular five year
or similar intervals means that politicians direct their actions according to the needs and desires of the
present citizens-their electorate."
90. Edward W. Ploman, "Foreword" in Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at xxvii.
91. This practice, discussed in greater detail in Part II.3.e below, discounts the economic value of
future impacts to the point where impacts occurring more than a hundred years in the future may
essentially be ignored in the decision-making process.
92. Eric T. Freyfogle, "Ethics, Community, and Private Land" (1996) 23 Ecology L.Q. 631 at 645.
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natural resources subject only to a duty to avoid (present) transboundary
environmental impacts.93
Meanwhile, culture itself has perhaps undergone a shift away from the
intergenerational perspective. A detailed analysis of this question would
have to occur on a country-by-country and community-by-community
basis, and is beyond the scope of this article. However, two modest claims
can be made. First, despite the cultural legacy of an intergenerational
ethic in some areas of the developing world, the urgency of poverty
has surely-and appropriately-created an intense focus on satisfying the
immediate needs of existing humans. 94 For the millions of people around
the world who lack access to adequate food or shelter, concern for the
future environment has likely become a luxury that will have to wait.
Secondly (and ironically), even as desperate poverty has pushed the future
out of view in some developing areas, Western culture is arguably too
busy enjoying its opulence to worry about the future. There is convincing
evidence that American culture in particular has adopted a largely present-
oriented and individualistic perspective. 9'
Unfortunately for the future, this turn away from responsibility to
future generations has occurred just at the moment in history when our
capacity to affect them has reached its apex.
2. Contemporary emergence of intergenerational equity in the realm of
environment
In the modem environmental era, the case for recognizing responsibilities
towards future generations has taken on a new cogency, as our ability to
impact future quality of life, and indeed the very survival of humanity,
93. See generally Franz Xaver Perrez, "The Relationship Between 'Permanent Sovereignty' and
the Obligation Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage" (1996) 26 Envtl. L. 1187; see
also Emeka Duruigbo, "Permanent Sovereignty and People's Ownership of Natural Resources in
International Law" (2006) 38 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 33.
94. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 31 1.L.M 849
(entered into force 21 March 1994), Article 4(7) [FCCC], cited in Christopher D. Stone, "Common
but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law" (2004) 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 276 at 295, n. 104
[Stone, "Differentiated Responsibilities"]: "economic and social development and poverty eradication
are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties"; Ruixue Quan, "Establishing
China's Environmental Justice Study Models" (2002) 14 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 461 at 480: "[i]n
most developing countries...environmental protection is still a 'luxury good'; Loubna Farchakh, The
Concept of l6tergenerational Equity in International Law (Montreal: McGill University, Faculty of
Law, Institute of Comparative Law, 2003) at 15-16, discussing the "priority given to poverty."
95. See, e.g., Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age ofDiminishing
Expectations (New York: Warner, 1979) at 21-26.
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has reached an unprecedented level.9 6 Indeed, Attfield asserts that it is
"seriously possible" that current anthropogenic phenomena (e.g., climate
change, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, etc.) could result in the
extinction of human beings and most animal species.9 7 In the alternative,
present human activities could result in an "abysmally low quality of life"
for future generations,9" or in a significant impoverishment in quality of
life through decreased biodiversity and/or the depletion of non-renewable
resources. 99 As a result of the power of the present generation to unilaterally
inflict enormous environmental harm on generations yet unborn, there is
a clear need to address intergenerational relations within international
environmental law.
The contemporary international legal community explicitly
recognized the imperative of protecting future generations from
environmental degradation in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the
96. Rachel Carson recognized this in her pivotal 1962 book Silent Spring, in which she wrote that
"[o]nly within the moment of time represented by the present century has one species - man [sic]
- acquired significant power to alter the nature of his world. During the past quarter century, this
power has ... increased to one of disturbing magnitude..." Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (New York:
First Mariner Books, 2002) at 5. See also paragraph I of the Stockholm Declaration, supra note
67, stating: "In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race on this planet a stage has been
reached when, through the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man [sic] has acquired the
power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale." Note, however,
that past human societies did have the power to profoundly affect future generations in their local
area. In his illuminating examination of failed societies, Jared Diamond describes human-induced
environmental disasters that, in some cases, resulted in the total extinction of the peoples involved.
Diamond hypothesizes that if we do not alter our current environmental course, a partial collapse
(involving a drastic decrease in quality of life rather than total human extinction) may occur. Jared M.
Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 2005).
97. Robin Attfield, "Environmental Ethics and Intergenerational Equity", (1998) 41 Inquiry 207 at
208-209. '
98. Ibid. at 209. Imagine, for example, a global environment so polluted that cancer and other
illnesses become virtually universal. For an excellent discussion of the explosion in cancer rates
associated with increased exposure to synthetic chemicals in the industrialized world, see Joe Thornton,
Pandora s Poison: Chlorine, Health, anda New Environmental Strategy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2000) at 155-199.
99. Attfield, supra note 97 at 210.
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Human Environment.00 Concern for future generations is evident in a
number of provisions of the Stockholm Declaration, including Principle 1
(recognizing "a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the
environment for present and future generations"), Principle 2 ("natural
resources...must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future
generations"), Principle 3 ("the capacity of the earth to produce vital
renewable resources must be maintained.. .restored or improved"),
Principle 5 (duty to prevent future exhaustion of non-renewable resources),
Principle 6 (prevention of serious or irreversible harm caused by pollution),
and Principle 11 (environmental policies must not adversely affect present
or future development of developing countries).
Although the Stockholm Declaration was a major step in establishing
intergenerational duties in the realm of environment, it lacked any detailed
framework for the balancing of present and future environmental interests.
In 1989, Professor Edith Brown Weiss filled this theoretical vacuum with
her pivotal book, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law,
Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity.10' In Fairness to
Future Generations was the result of a United Nations-sponsored study
and was viewed as both a conceptual tool-kit'0 2 and a "normative call to
action,"'13 responding in part to the recent publication of the Brundtland
Commission report.' Brown Weiss explicitly sought both to make a case
for extending fairness to future generations and to provide a conceptual
vehicle for getting there. That vehicle is the doctrine of intergenerational
equity.
100. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 67. See also International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, 2 December 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [Whaling Convention], recognizing in its Preamble the
"interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources
represented by the whale stocks"; African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, 15 September 1968, 1001 U.N.T.S. 3 [African Conservation Convention], stating in its
Preamble that natural resources should be conserved, utilized and developed "by establishing and
maintaining their rational utilization for the present and future welfare of mankind"; Convention for the
-Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 16 November 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [ World
Heritage Convention], providing in Article 4 that "[e]ach State Party to this Convention recognizes
that the duty of ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission
to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage. .belongs primarily to that State" within its
available resources; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, 3 March 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, 12 ILM 1085 [CITES], recognizing in its Preamble that "wild
fauna and flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems
of the earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come."
101. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73. Note that there were antecedents to this
work-in the literature. See, e.g., Bryan 0. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and the Rights of Future
Generations" (1982) 4 Env'l Ethics 319.
102. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at xxiii.
103. Ibid. at xxii.
104. Ibid. at xxv.
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3. Intergenerational equity as a legal doctrine
Although international legal scholarship and law refer frequently to
the "concept" or "principle" of intergenerational equity,05 Brown
Weiss actually articulated a detailed and coherent legal doctrine of
intergenerational equity, allowing for a reasoned implementation of the
principle of environmental fairness to future generations.
a. Normative premises
Although the doctrine of intergenerational equity incorporates both rights
and responsibilities, Brown Weiss exhibits a communitarian orientation
that appears to privilege responsibility to the (inter-temporal) human family
as a starting point for the analysis. Brown Weiss argues that "[t]he purpose
of human society must be to realize and protect the welfare and well-
being of every generation,"' citing Edmund Burke's theory of society as
a partnership among generations. 10 7 The basic normative premise here is
that the survival of human beings is a good thing, and indeed gives rise to a
moral imperative which Jean Rostand called "the obligation to endure."'0 8
Beginning with this notion that human society is an intergenerational
partnership whose purpose is to assure the continued survival and well-
being of each generation, Brown Weiss next examines a mechanism for
establishing a just relationship between generations.
Taking a Rawlsian approach, she suggests a thought experiment in
which no generation knows at what time it will be the living generation,
how many members it will have, or how many generations there ultimately
will be. 109 She argues that a generation in this position "would want to
inherit the common patrimony of the planet in as good condition as it
has been for any previous generation and to have as good access to it as
105. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion, [1996]
I.C.J. Rep. 226 at 455, 502, online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/ iunan/iunanframe.htm>
[Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion] where in his Dissenting Opinion Justice Weeramantry refers
to intergenerational equity alternately as a "concept" or "principle"; Young-Gyoo Shim, "Intellectual
Property Protection of Biotechnology and Sustainable Development in International Law" (2003)
29 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 157, 216, describing the "principle of intergenerational equity" as
"an element of sustainable development"; Sato, supra note 78 at 507, describing commitment to
intergenerational equity as a "guiding principle" of sustainable development as articulated by the
Brundtland Commission; Cherie Metcalf, "Indigenous Rights and the Environment: Evolving
International Law" (2004) 35 Ottawa L. Rev. 101 at 139, describing intergenerational equity as a
"core concept in international environmental law."
106. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 23.
107. Ibid.; see also Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. by J.G.A. Pocock
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) at 84-85.
108. Cited in Carson, supra note 96 at 13.
109. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 23.
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previous generations.""' Thus, the central justification for intergenerational
equity is the notion of justice. Brown Weiss argues that international
law has always been concerned with justice, and that the doctrine of
intergenerational equity merely extends this notion further into the inter-
temporal dimension.'
Brown Weiss identifies four criteria which any theory of inter-
generational equity must meet. First, the theory should be equitable among
generations, "neither authorizing the present generation to exploit resources
to the exclusion of future generations, nor imposing unreasonable burdens
on the present generation to meet indeterminate future needs."'" 2 Second,
principles of intergenerational equity should be value-neutral; "[t]hey
must give future generations flexibility to achieve their goals according
to their own values.""' 3 Third, such principles "should be reasonably
clear in application to foreseeable situations."" 4 Finally, principles of
intergenerational equity "must be generally shared by different cultural
traditions and be generally acceptable to different economic and political
systems."
Although perhaps encompassed in the fourth criterion, it is unfortunate
that Brown Weiss did not explicitly include the element of fairness
between developing and developed nations at this stage. Brown Weiss does
address this imperative through the articulation of an intra-generational
component in the doctrine of intergenerational equity. However, the
absence of an explicit recognition of the unique concerns of developing
countries in the framing theoretical criteria may in part explain why the
intra-generational element in Brown Weiss's analysis has been viewed by
some as underdeveloped.''
b. Definition and content of intergenerational equity
Taking the constituent terms separately, "equity" as used in the context
of Brown Weiss's formulation of intergeneration equity appears to refer
primarily to a principle of distributive justice. 16 That is, equity concerns
the just allocation of benefits, in this case environmental benefits (and
110. Ibid. at 24.
111. Ibid. at 28, 34.
112. Ibid. at 38.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. See Catherine Redgwell, Intergenerational Trusts and Environmental Protection (Manchester:
Juris, 1999) at 109.
116. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 36-37.
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presumably also burdens)." 7 "Intergenerational" as used in this context
denotes relations between all those currently living, and generations yet
unbom, indefinitely into the future."l8 Although the term "intergenerational
equity" could be used to refer broadly to distributive justice between or
among generations (for example in considering the fairness of leaving
future generations with a fiscal debt), the term as used in this Article refers
to a specifically environmental legal doctrine." 9
The environmental law doctrine of intergenerational equity as
articulated in In Fairness to Future Generations holds that:
each generation receives a natural and cultural legacy in trust from
previous generations and holds it in trust for future generations. This
relationship imposes upon each generation certain planetary obligations
to conserve the natural and cultural resource base for future generations
and also gives each generation certain planetary rights as beneficiaries
of the trust to benefit from the legacy of their ancestors. These planetary
obligations and planetary rights form the corpus of a proposed doctrine
of intergenerational equity, or justice between generations. 120
Brown Weiss identifies three distinct kinds of "equity problems"
requiring an intergenerational approach: depletion of resources for future
generations, degradation in quality of resources for future generations, and
the problem of access to use and benefits of the resources received from
past generations. 2' Concomitantly, she elaborates three corresponding
"principles" of intergenerational equity.
The first, which she terms "Conservation of Options", requires the
present generation to conserve the diversity of the natural and cultural
resource base. This principle does not require the precise preservation
of the status quo, recognizing both that ecological systems are inherently
dynamic (and therefore the content of the biological resource base will
inevitably change over time),' 2 and that technological advances may
create substitutes for certain existing resources or significantly optimize
117. Ibid.
118. For an interesting discussion of alternative definitions of "generation" and "intergenerational,"
see Lawrence B. Solum, "To Our Children's Children's Children: The Problems of Intergenerational
Ethics" (2001) 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 163.
119. Although the doctrine can and is being used in the domestic context, it includes content (e.g., the
duty of states to future foreign nationals) that is distinctly international in character.
120. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 2.
121. Ibid. at6.
122. Ibid. at4 .
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their exploitation. 23 However, the principle requires that "on balance the
diversity of the resource base be maintained,"'2 4
The second principle, "Conservation of Quality," requires the present
generation to pass the planet on to future generations "in no worse condition
than that in which it was received."' 25 Again, this principle recognizes that
the condition of the environment will undoubtedly change, but mandates
that its overall quality must be maintained. Given the complexity of the
science of ecology, it may fairly be argued that the notion of "overall"
global environmental quality is so vague as to be meaningless. In this
respect, Brown Weiss concedes that a more detailed framework must be
developed for evaluating net impacts on environmental quality. 26
The third principle, "Conservation of Access," requires that members
of the present generation be provided with equitable rights of access to
the planetary legacy, while conserving this access for future generations.
Professor Redgwell explains that the principle of Conservation of Access
"reflects a basic trust obligation, namely, the general duty of a trustee
to maintain equality between the beneficiaries, and to act impartially
between life tenant (the present generation) and 'remaindermen'
(future generations)."' 27 Brown Weiss argues that the principles of
intergenerational equity, and Conservation of Access in particular, require
wealthier members of the present generation to assist the poorer members
in both carrying out their conservation obligations and enjoying their
rights to benefit from the planetary legacy. 28
Although this approach may be an attempt to preempt developing
world concerns with the theory, positing intra-generational equity as a
component of inter-generational equity arguably obscures important
conflicts between the two. The theory rests on a presumption that it is
scientifically possible to adequately address present needs throughout the
world while still passing on the planet to succeeding generations in no
worse condition than that in which it was received.' 29 To the extent that
this presumption is false, Brown Weiss's attempt to harmonize inter- and
123. Ibid. at 42.
124. Ibid. [emphasis in original].
125. Edith Brown Weiss, "Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment"
(1990) 84 A.J.I.L. 198 at 202 [Brown Weiss, "Rights and Obligations"].
126. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 43, 128-144.
127. Redgwell, supra note 115 at 78.
128. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 45.
129. Consider, for example, the use of DDT to combat malaria in Africa. This practice may
compromise future health and biodiversity but saves lives and prevents suffering in the present. See
Carson, supra note 96, and David L. Mulliken, Jennifer D. Zambone & Christine G. Rolph, "DDT: A
Persistent Lifesaver" (2005) 19:4 N.R&E. 3.
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intra-generational equity may prove to be problematic. Nonetheless, even
if and where we are faced with open conflict between present and future
generations, the. framework developed by Brown Weiss may be useful in
structuring our analysis of the interests that should be taken into account.
Brown Weiss asserts that, "[t]he dual role of each generation as trustee
of the planet for present and future generations and as beneficiary of the
planetary legacy imposes certain obligations upon each generation and
gives it certain rights. These may be called planetary, or intergenerational,
rights and obligations."' 30
c. Planetary obligations
The planetary obligations proposed by Brown Weiss flow directly from
the principles of intergenerational equity described above. Thus, the
obligations are to conserve diversity, quality, and access.131 Clarifying these
obligations further, Brown Weiss argues that the three planetary obligations
translate into five specific duties of use. First, the duty to conserve
resources requires present generations to conserve both renewable and
non-renewable natural resources.132 Endangered species and unique natural
resources may require strict preservation,'33 but generally this planetary
duty allows for the sustainable development of resources. Second, the
duty to ensure equitable ise, defined as "reasonable, non-discriminatory
access to the [planetary] legacy"'34 includes both the negative obligation
to refrain from infringing on the access rights of other beneficiaries and
positive obligations to "assist those who would otherwise be too poor to
have reasonable access and use."'35
The third duty, the duty to avoid adverse impacts on the environment,
flows from responsibilities both to present co-beneficiaries of the
planetary trust and future generations.'36 It "emphasizes prevention and
mitigation of damage"' 37 and implicates procedural environmental rights
and duties including notice, information, consultation, and environmental
assessment.'38 With respect to environmental assessment in particular,
Brown Weiss observes that intergenerational equity requires adequate
consideration of long-term impacts. 139
130. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 45.
131. Ibid. at47.
132. Ibid. at 50.
133. Ibid at51.
134. Ibid. at 55.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid. at 59-60.
137. Ibid at 60.
138. Ibid. at 60-61.
139. Ibid. at 63.
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The fourth duty articulated by Brown Weiss as a component of planetary
obligations is the duty to prevent disasters, minimize damage, and provide
emergency assistance.140 The duty to prevent disasters requires states,
inter alia, to adopt adequate safety standards for hazardous activities and
to monitor such activities. 241 When an environmental disaster does occur,
this duty obligates the affected state to minimize environmental damage as
much as practicable, and similarly requires non-affected states to provide
assistance in order to minimize the damage. 42 Finally, there is the duty to
compensate for damage to the environment. 143
Although planetary obligations theoretically. attach to all members
of the present generation, the State functions as the guarantor of these
obligations. 44 Notably, Brown Weiss argues that planetary obligations
are also owed by states to future nationals of other states. 4 1
d. Planetary rights
The content of planetary rights in the doctrine of intergenerational equity
mirrors that of planetary obligations. Thus, planetary rights include
the right to diversity, quality, and access. Three key observations may
be made concerning the unique nature of rights within the doctrine of
intergenerational equity. First, in a direct reversal of the traditional
human rights paradigm, planetary rights in intergenerational equity are
correlative with and possibly even secondary to obligations. "[P]lanetary
rights are the obverse of the planetary obligations.' 46 Second, planetary
rights in Brown Weiss's formulation have a dual nature. The planetary
rights of future generations are group rights, not individual rights; these
rights should be asserted by a representative for the group as a whole. 147
This qualification appears to be Brown Weiss's attempt to answer the
argument that rights can only attach to an identifiable, existing party. 148
In contrast, planetary rights crystallize into individual rights within
the present generation, though Brown Weiss notes that "the remedies
for violations of these rights will often benefit the rest of the generation,
140. Ibid. at 70 ff.
141. Ibid. at 71.
142. Ibid. at 74-79.
143. Ibid. at 50. •
144. Ibid. at 48.
145. Ibid. at 26-27.
146. Ibid at 95 [emphasis added].
147. Ibid. at 96.
148. Ibid. at 96-97. See also Lynda M. Warren, "Legislating for Tomorrow's Problems Today -
Dealing with Intergenerational Equity" (2005) 7 Env'tI L. Rev. 165 at 169-170: "[i]n law, rights are
associated with parties-individuals, corporations, States-and, indeed, can only exist where there is an
identifiable beneficiary."
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not only the individual, and in this sense they may be said to retain their
character as group rights.."149 Third, in keeping with the nature of planetary
obligations (which again determines that of the corresponding planetary
rights), the State is the guarantor of the planetary rights of both present
and future generations. 5
e. The time horizon
If present generations are to take into account the needs of the future,
we must determine how far into the future our planning horizon
should extend. Cost benefit analysis (an increasingly dominant tool in
environmental decision-making) 5' generally applies a discount rate to
future environmental (and other) costs and benefits roughly equivalent to
the rate of inflation.5 2 Critics argue that "this practice has the ridiculous
result that costs and benefits more than thirty years hence are treated as if
they had quite miniscule significance, and the interests of generations of
more than a hundred years hence as if they had no significance at all."'5 3
Thus, cost benefit analysis presumes no obligations to future generations,
beyond a few decades into the future.
Taking a middle ground, de-Shalit argues that "positive obligations" to
future generations, that is the affirmative duty to provide resources, "fade
away" as future generations become more remote in time. 54 Nonetheless,
"[t]o people of the very remote future we [still] have a strong 'negative'
obligation...to avoid causing them enormous harm or bringing them
death....
Brown Weiss takes the position that planetary rights inhere to
"all generations" without limitation. 5 6 In theory, if the principles of
intergenerational equity are respected, each generation will pass the planet
on in as good condition as that in which it was received, and there should
be no need for a "cut-off' point in the recognition of planetary rights.
However, there may be substantial practical and psychological barriers to
149. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 97.
150. Ibid. at 109.
151. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and
the Value of Nothing (New York: New Press, 2004).
152. Attfield, supra note 97 at 213.
153. Ibid. There is a rich literature regarding the issue of discounting; see, e.g., Erhun Kula, ime
Discounting and Future Generations: The Harmful Effects of an Untrue Economic Theory (Westport,
Conn.: Quorum, 1997); Daniel A. Farber, "From Here to Eternity: Environmental Law and Future
Generations" (2003) U. Ill. L. Rev. 289; Emilio Padilla, "Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability"
(2002) 41 Ecological Economics 69.
154. de-Shalit, supra note 78 at 13.
155. Ibid. See also Daniel A. Farber, Eco-pragmatism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999)
at 161: "the current generation has at least a responsibility to leave later generations the minimum
requirements for decent lives, which means avoiding any severe, irreparable environmental damage."
156. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 97.
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requiring present sacrificial action for the sake of protecting rights far into
the future.
15 7
f. Development vs. environmental protection
The doctrine of intergenerational equity as articulated by Brown Weiss
explicitly eschews a strictly preservationist model that would require
present generations to make undue sacrifices in service of the future
good. 58 At the same time, it rejects the opposite of preservationism, the
"opulent model," which presumes that the welfare of future generations
is either irrelevant or is best served by maximizing the production of
financial wealth in the present. 59 As Brown Weiss notes, the latter ignores
the reality of ecological limits, including humans' biological dependence
on the rest of the ecosphere for survival."6 Thus, like the concept of
sustainable development, the doctrine of intergenerational equity attempts
to strike a balance between use and enjoyment of the earth's resources
by the present, which will invariably result in changes to the ecological
status quo, and conservation of adequate natural resources for the future.
However, this aspect of the theory again runs into the difficulty of
scientific feasibility. It is possible, for example, that the only option that
can preserve the survival of the planet over the next five hundred years is
strict preservation, or even preservation plus restoration.' 6
g. Enforcement
In the theory of intergenerational equity, although both rights and duties
attach to individuals (and non-State groups of individuals), the State is
the primary guarantor of planetary rights and obligations and also acts
as "guardian ad litem for future generations.' 62 Brown Weiss proposes
that, in the international arena, appropriate enforcement mechanisms
could include the creation of a Planetary Rights Commission analogous
157. See de-Shalit, supra note 78 at 14; Farber, supra note 155 at 153-154; Padilla, supra note 153.
158. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 22-24.
159. Ibid. at23.
160. Ibid. See also Karin Mickelson & William Rees, "The Environment: Ecological and Ethical
Dimensions" in Elaine Hughes et al., eds., Environmental Law and Policy (Toronto: Emond
Montgomery, 1998) 2 at 38:
On an infinite planet, it might matter little how far human perceptions of nature departed
from the "true" nature of external reality. However, as the scale of the human enterprise
approaches that of the ecosphere, it is essential that the internal structure and "variety," and
the behaviour ofour management models mirror, or at least acknowledge, the corresponding
characteristics of the natural world.
161. Brown Weiss is aware of the difficulty of scientific uncertaintx and recommends increased
monitoring, research, and development of predictive techniques. See Brown Weiss, Future Generations,
supra note 73 at 43, 128-144.
162. Ibid. at 109.
108 The Dalhousie Law Journal
to human rights tribunals.163 She suggests that the jurisdiction of such a
body should cover both public bodies and private multinational entities,'
64
and should be empowered to take complaints from individual members
of the present generation. 65 She suggests further that individuals and
communities would be under a duty to report violations of planetary rights
to the appropriate bodies. 66
Brown Weiss proposes the creation of a correlative body specifically
to address planetary obligations, and the obverse planetary rights offuture
generations - an independent Commission on the Future of the Planet. 1
67
Commissioners would have "overall responsibility for monitoring
compliance with our obligations to future generations and for assisting
governments and other instrumentalities in meeting these obligations,'
168
while ombudspeople would be responsible for identifying risks to future
generations, receiving complaints, and educating the public regarding
conservation of the planet for future generations.
69
Brown Weiss further suggests that representatives of future generations
should be granted standing in both international and domestic courts. 70
4. Critiques and counter-arguments
A rich body of literature has emerged critiquing the theoretical basis for
intergenerational equity, marshalling arguments based in ethics, logic, and
moral theory. 7' The predominant arguments are as follows:
a. Future generations are incapable of having rights
A number of legal and philosophical commentators have challenged
the notion of planetary rights (or rights of any kind) attaching to
future generations. One interesting school of thought argues that it is
inappropriate and perhaps self-defeating to recognize rights for future
generations because our current choices will alter the identity of those who
163. Ibid. at 111.
164. Ibid
165. Ibid at 113.
166. Ibid at 111.
167. Ibid. at 148-150.
168. Ibid. at 149.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid. at 120-121.
171. See, e.g., Wilfred Beckerman & Joanna Pasek, Justice, Posterity, and the Environment (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001); Paul A. Barresi, "Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An
Intragenerational Alternative to Intergenerational Equity in the International Environmental Arena"
(1997) 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 59; Jeffrey M. Gaba, "Environmental Ethics and Our Moral Relationship
to Future Generations: Future Rights and Present Virtue" (1999) 24 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 249; Graham
Mayeda, "Where Should Johannesburg Take Us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to Sustainable
Development in the Context of International Environmental Law" (2004) 15 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. &
Pol'y 29.
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are ultimately born. As a result, if we attempt to discharge environmental
duties to future generations, we will inadvertently (but inevitably) deny
some potential members of such generations the opportunity to be born.172
Gosseries provides an example:
If I take a car every day to go to my job, this will have two types of
relevant consequences. It will have a negative impact on the present
and future state of the atmosphere, given that it will increase emissions.
However, it will also have an impact on the identity of my future child.
For, coming back home earlier or later than if I had taken a bike will also
affect the timing of my sexual intercourse. Hence, given the very large
number of competing spermatozoa, it is very likely to affect the very
identity of the child I will conceive together with my beloved.
Imagine now a father having to face his daughter. Having grown 17 and
having become a green activist, she asks him: "why did you not choose
the bike rather than the car? The atmosphere would be much cleaner
today! And given your circumstances at that time, you had no special
reason not to take the bike!" The father may well answer: "True. Still,
had I done so, you would not be here. Since your life in such a polluted
environment is still worth living, why blame me? I certainly did not
harm you. Which one of your rights did I violate then?" 171
The uncertain identity of future individuals undoubtedly raises difficult
theoretical challenges to the recognition of rights for future generations.
However, a compelling counter-argument recognizes that the present
generation cannot help but affect the identity of future humans. The "do
nothing" approach is itself a decision with substantial implications, and
there is no tenable argument for the moral superiority of this alternative.
Thus, Mary Anne Warren posits that "our duty to preserve the environment
is a duty to the generation that does come into existence, regardless of
whether it is the same generation that would have existed had we done
172. Derek Parfit, "On Doing the Best for Our Children" in Michael D. Bayles, ed., Ethics and
Population (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1976) 100 at 101, cited in Mayeda, supra note 171 at 43.
At 44 Mayeda then quotes Anthony D'Amato, "Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve
the Global Environment?" (1990) 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 190 at 191-92: "If in exercise of ... such an
alleged duty [to future generations] we commit an act of environmental intervention that denies the
opportunity to be born to [certain] individuals, we cannot possibly be making them better off by virtue
of our intervention."
173. Axel Gosseries, "Constitutionalizing Future Rights?" (2004) 2 Intergenerational Justice Review
10at 10-11.
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nothing."' 74 Similarly, Brown Weiss asserts that "[t]o evaluate whether the
interests represented in planetary rights are being adequately protected
does not depend upon knowing the number or kinds of individuals that
may ultimately exist in any given future generation.'
75
Perhaps more fundamental than the "identity challenge"'' 76 is the
argument that because future generations do not yet exist, they simply
cannot hold rights:
[T]he fact that future generations will have interests in the future, and
may well have rights in the future, does not mean that they can have
interests today, that is, before they are bom. It may well be that having
certain interests implies having certain rights. But future generations do
not at this point in time.. .have any interests (emphasis in original). 77
The argument is undoubtedly attractive from a logical perspective. It is
counter-intuitive to conceive ofrights belonging to anon-existent entity such
as unborn future generations. Proponents of rights for future generations
answer the "impossibility" claim with the straightforward proposition that
future generations can have rights if a critical mass of people in the present
recognizes such rights. This line of thought reflects both a post-modernist
recognition of the malleability of rights consciousness, and the positivist
assertion that legal rights exist to the extent that they are incorporated into
positive law.
Tremmel, for example, observes:
We possess a moral feeling for future generations. Due to this feeling we
can ascribe moral rights to future generations. In this sense they do have
"rights"...
[Fjuture individuals... "have" moral rights as soon as mankind found
[sic] a consensus about that. This becomes more clear when we take a
look at how someone gets a legal right. He or she gets it as soon as it is
codified by the lawmaker. If the lawmaker would codify rights of future
generations, how can anybody renounce that future individuals "have"
174. Mary Anne Warren, "Future Generations" in Tom Regan & Donald VanDeVeer, eds.,AndJustice
for All (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982) 139 as quoted by Mayeda, supra note 171 at 44, n.
56. See also Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations" in W. Blackstone, ed.,
Philosophy and Environmental Crisis (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974) 43 at 65: "The
identity of the owners of [future generations'] interests is now necessarily obscure, but the fact of their
interest-ownership is crystal clear, and that is all that is necessary to certify the coherence of present
talk about their rights."
175. Brown Weiss, "Rights and Obligations," supra note 125 at 205.
176. See Gosseries, supra note 173.
177. Beckerman & Pasek, supra note 171 at 21.
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such rights?' 78
Professor Stone, for his part, argues that even if future generations may
not have moral rights, we could, "quite intelligibly," accord them legal
rights.1 7
9
Finally (on this point), even if one were to accept that future
generations cannot have legal or moral rights in the present, one can
still recognize legal obligations on the part of the present generation
towards future generations. 8 ° Thus, the notion that present generations
are both beneficiaries of a planetary trust handed down from the past and
trustees of that legacy for the benefit of future generations remains viable.
Similarly, the planetary obligations to conserve biodiversity, quality, and
access are untouched by the rights critiques, as are the planetary rights
of present generations. Only the planetary rights of future generations
are called into question, and the issue is academic if present generations
acknowledge an obligation independent of the rights question. In other
words, the doctrine of intergenerational equity, with some modifications,
remains a viable legal framework irrespective of the debate regarding the
viability of rights for future generations.
b. The uncertainty offuture generations 'preferences
Beyond the question of rights for future generations, some commentators
claim that the formulation of obligations towards future generations is
either impracticable or inappropriate because "[cjuite simply, we do not
know what the future wants.' 8' The argument is that we cannot have an
obligation to protect the interests of future generations, because we cannot
ascertain what those interests might be. Moreover, the actions taken by the
present generation will shape future preferences, and, in particular future
generations will be unlikely to desire a state of environment which they
have never known. 182
Of course, the fatal flaw in this argument is that it ignores the biological
bottom line of being human. Although human beings living a hundred
or a thousand years in the future may have beliefs and preferences that
differ substantially (or even radically) from the present, they will most
178. JOrg Chet Tremmel, "Is a Theory of Intergenerational Justice Possible? A Response to Beckerman"
(2004) 2 Intergenerational Justice Review 6 at 8.
179. Christopher D. Stone, The Gnat is Older Than Man (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1993) at 273 [Stone, The Gnat].
180. These obligations may either be viewed as present obligations correlated with future rights or as
"non-correlative duties." See Trakman & Gatien, supra note 2.
181. Gaba, supranote 171 at 260.
182. Ibid. at 264.
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likely still need to breathe air, drink water, and eat.'83 Even if, through
massive technological advances, it may one day be possible to replace
or synthesize crucial natural resources such as air or water, to gamble on
such a possibility would be an egregious violation of the Precautionary
Principle." 4 As Attfield puts it, "future generations... [who] find that they
have been deprived by earlier generations of opportunities for satisfying
some of their more basic needs, could reasonably criticize their ancestors
for failing to facilitate the satisfaction of foreseeable vital interests."' 85Some commentators go beyond the argument that future interests are
unascertainable, arguing that it is in fact inappropriate-a form of inter-
temporal imperialism-for present generations to assess the interests of
those yet unborn. Mayeda, for example, argues that intergenerational
equity may be used as a means to "import present values and impose
these on the future" thus "restrict[ing] the liberty of future generations by
binding them to [the present] concept" of the good.18 6
But future generations are invariably bound by the decisions of the
present. If we choose, for example, to deforest and desertify vast portions
of the planet, future generations will be forced to deal with the resulting
constraints on their opportunities. It is simply impossible to stay out of
the affairs of future generations. The only question is whether the present
generation will consciously consider future interests, or simply allow the
future to unfold randomly, with potentially devastating impacts on unborn
generations.
c. Limits on future-oriented altruism
A serious challenge to the credibility of the doctrine of intergenerational
equity as articulated by Brown Weiss concerns its long time horizon.
As noted above, Brown Weiss argues that planetary rights inhere in all
183. See B. Barry, "Justice Between Generations" in P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz, eds., Law, Morality, and
Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977) 268 at 274-75:
[Although] we don't know what the precise tastes of our remote descendants will be,... they
are unlikely to include a desire for skin cancer, soil erosion, or the inundation of all low-
lying areas as a result of the melting of the ice-caps. And, other things being equal, the
interests of future generations cannot be harmed by our leaving them more choices rather
than fewer.
184. The Precautionary Principle holds that "[w]hen there is substantial scientific uncertainty about
the risks and benefits of a proposed activity, policy decisions should be made in a way that errs on
the side of caution with respect to the environment and the health of the public." David Kriebel et al.,
"The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science" (2001) Envtl Health Perspectives 109, no.
9 at 875. See also James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, "Refining the Precautionary Principle in
International Environmental Law" (1995) 14 Va. Envtl. L. J. 423 at 423, 425, 437.
185. Attfield, supra note 97 at 212.
186. Mayeda, supra note 171 at 61.
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generations. As de-Shalit colourfully explains, whether or not this is true
in the abstract, the theory underlying international environmental law
should not demand what is absolutely impossible. If people are told
that they should share natural resources.. .with people who will be alive
six or twelve generations from now, they will at least listen and may
even tend to agree. But if they are told that they should share access to
[natural resources] with someone in the year 2993 or 3993, the response
will probably be, "To hell with morality and intergenerational justice!
This is ridiculous; such policies do not make any sense because they are
inconceivable!" 87
Thus, it may simply be unrealistic to expect to gain widespread support for
a paradigm shift based on a notion of responsibility towards an amorphous
and undifferentiated body of "future generations" to which present
individuals share no particular connection. I concur with de-Shalit that it
is likely most helpful to employ a planning horizon somewhere between
six and twelve generations into the future. Traditional legal rules, such as
the Haudenosaunee rule .of seven generations, may assist in determining
the appropriate guideline. At the same time, the time horizon should be
context-specific. In particular, it may be appropriate to employ Brown
Weiss's indefinite approach to situations raising a risk of catastrophic
future harm.1 8
d. The intra-generational alternative
In an important 1997 article, PaulA. Barressi suggests that Brown Weiss's
doctrine of intergenerational equity ought to be rejected in favour of a
theory based solely in intra-generational, intra-national, and individual
rights and duties. Baressi argues that the goals of intergenerational equity
could be accomplished by a theory based on an intra-generational, intra-
national contract among present individuals made for the benefit of future
nationals of their own state, as third party beneficiaries. "In such a contract,
each present generation national of State A would promise each of the
other present generation nationals of State A to use the Earth sustainably,
and to do whatever else was necessary to achieve the[ir] intergenerational
goals...""89 Barresi notes that the latter clause of this "contract" would likely
require present generation nationals of developed countries to provide aid
to those in developing countries to enable them to practice sustainability.190
In this scenario, "It]he future generation nationals of State A would stand
187. de-Shalit, supra note 78 at 14.
188. Seeibid. at 13.
189. Barresi, supra note 171 at 82.
190. Ibid.
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as intended third-party beneficiaries to the contract. The present and
future generation nationals of State B would stand as incidental third party
beneficiaries to the contract." 19' Barresi contends that his approach would
more effectively accomplish the goal of environmental fairness to future
generations than the doctrine of intergenerational equity (as articulated by
Brown Weiss). His theory rests on two main propositions.
First, Barresi contends that any theory of environmental obligation to
the future should account for biological limitations on human concern for
future generations. According to Barresi:
Our concern for individuals in 'future generations tends to vary in
proportion to the degree to which we perceive those individuals to be
genetically related to us. Thus, we tend to care more about our own
offspring than about the offspring of our siblings. We tend to care more
about the offspring of our siblings than about the offspring of our distant
cousins, and so on. We tend to care least about the offspring of people
who seem to be the most distantly related to us. To a greater or lesser
degree, the offspring of people of races, ethnic groups, or territorial
jurisdictions different from our own tend to fall into this category. 192
Barresi concludes that the most effective way to achieve intergenerational
environmental goals is to appeal to individuals' concern for their own
genetic descendants, and that sustainability should therefore be pursued
by way of an agreement among present generation nationals of the same
state.
As with socio-biological analysis generally, this argument ignores
the mutability and contingency of human emotional response. While the
scenario presented by Barresi may be common, it is by no means universal.
Adoptive parents, for example, exhibit care and concern for their adopted
children (and grandchildren) despite the absence of genetic relation.
Moreover, even in the scenario in which genetic relation does affect degree
.of care, Barresi's equation of genetic relation and nationality is untenable
given the degree of migration and ethnic diversity in many countries. 193 In
addition, the existence of affinity groups that transcend national borders,
94
191. Ibid.
192. Ibid. at 72-73.
193. See Edith Brown Weiss, "A Reply to Barresi's 'Beyond Fairness to Future Generations' (1997)
I I Tul. Envtl. L.J. 89 at 92 [Brown Weiss, "A Reply to Barresi"], noting the increasing migration of
individuals to and from different countries.
194. Consider, for example, that a member of a particular religion in State A may feel a greater
concern for fiture members of that religion in State B than for future non-believers in State A.
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and the increasing ease of international communication, have extended
communities of care' 95 well beyond the nation state.'96
Second, Barresi argues that the doctrine of intergenerational equity
is an inappropriate tool for achieving environmental protection because
it is inconsistent with Western values. He notes that Western nations bear
primary responsibility for the current state of the global environmental and
asserts that only the wealthy Western nations have the financial ability to
arrest global environmental deterioration. Brown Weiss correctly counters
that the success of the concept of intergenerational equity during the 1990s
indicates that it does in fact resonate with Western values.'97 Perhaps more
importantly, the rapid development of non-Western economies (e.g., India
and China) strongly militates in favor of a legal framework consistent
with diverse cultural traditions beyond the West.9 8
e. The North-South equity critique
Professor Graham Mayeda argues that Brown Weiss's doctrine
of intergenerational equity inappropriately underemphasizes the
moral importance of the past, and, in particular the colonization and
marginalization of the developing world by the developed.'99 Mayeda
also asserts that intergenerational equity "undermines the importance of
human dignity and the equal worth of all" because it treats the present
generation as a mere means to the end of future generations' happiness. 20
This latter argument is particularly cogent where, as in developing
countries, presently existing humans have urgent, unmet needs. Indeed, in
the absence of the intra-generational component in Brown Weiss's theory,
one can imagine a highly unjust application of intergenerational equity,
in which present humans who are living in poverty are required to refrain
from resource use in order to provide environmental benefits to privileged
future citizens of wealthy nations. 20 1
195. See Brown Weiss, "A Reply to Barresi," supra note 193 at 92, noting that "multinational
corporations, ethnic minorities, subunits of national governments, local nongovernmental organizations,
ad hoc associations, and illicit transnational actors" have all become highly significant members of the
international community-
196. Even if Barresi's hierarchy of human concern were accurate, it would not be an appropriate basis
for the formation of international (or domestic) law and policy. Rather, to the extent that it exists, the
tendency to limit one's concern to members of one's own family, ethnicity, and nationality is one that
international law and policy should seek to mitigate and counteract.
197. Brown Weiss, "A Reply to Barresi," supra note 193 at 90-91.
198. See Barresi, supra note 171 at 63-70 and Brown Weiss, "A Reply to Barresi," ibid.
199. Mayeda, supra note 171 at 54-56.
200. Ibid. at 45.
201. Consider, for example, whether existing humans living in poverty in developing countries
should be prevented from consuming rainforest in order to protect future humans in wealthy Northern
countries from adverse impacts on climate and global air quality.
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At first blush, Mayeda's position appears to discount the explicit intra-
generational component in Brown Weiss's doctrine of intergenerational
equity. After all, the doctrine of intergenerational equity recognizes the
present generation's right, as beneficiary of the planetary trust, to use and
enjoy its planetary rights. With respect to the moral significance of the
past, the doctrine includes a duty on the part of developed countries (many
of which are former colonizers) to assist developing countries (largely
former targets of colonization) in accessing the planetary legacy, and in
meeting their planetary obligations to the future. Thus, one could argue
that the doctrine's imposition of present duties is an appropriate response
to past injustice. Nonetheless, Mayeda's critiques do point to the relative
underdevelopment of intra-generational equity by Brown Weiss. Indeed,
Redgwell observes that In Fairness to Future Generations contains only
seven explicit references to intra-generational equity.2
02
More profoundly, characterizing intra-generational equity as a
component of intergenerational equity obscures the real potential for
conflict between the present and future. There may indeed be cases
in which protecting the rights of future generations would entail
treating the present generation as a mere means to the end of future
generations' happiness, and present generations in the developing world
are disproportionately vulnerable to the diversion of resources into the
future. 203 The intra-generational, developing world critique requires that
the doctrine of intergenerational equity be interpreted alongside principles
such as Environmental Justice (EJ) and Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities (CDR)."° Intergenerational Equity may also need to be
refined to address more explicitly those scenarios in which the welfare of
the present and that of the future simply cannot co-exist.
Nonetheless, when complemented by EJ and CDR, the doctrine of
intergenerational equity remains a cogent and viable legal framework for
international environmental law and policy.
5. - The affirmative argument for environmental responsibility to future
generations
Thus far, I have examined the major critiques of the theory of
intergenerational equity and concluded that the doctrine remains viable.
202. Redgwell, supra note 115 at 109, n. 208.
203. For a summary of other common arguments against duties towards future generations, see
Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Ethical Theory versus Unethical Practice: Radiation Protection and
Future Generations" in Robert J. Goldstein, ed., Environmental Ethics and Law (Aldershot: Ashgate/
Dartmouth, 2004) 593 at 603.
204. See contra Mayeda, supra note 171, positing CDR as an alternative (rather than a complement)
to intergenerational equity.
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However, I have intentionally avoided taking a position on the foundational
question as to why present generations should be held responsible to the
future. In my view this question is, at base, a philosophical one. Its answer
depends almost entirely upon the worldview of the inquirer. From the
Rawlsian perspective, fairness to the future flows from the realization that
in designing a just society in the absence of information as to one's rank
in that society, most of us would choose a system that provided equal
opportunity among generations. Democrats maybe motivated by a concern
for preserving future generations' basic freedom to choose, while faith-
based actors may be motivated by notions of a sacred trust, or stewardship
obligation, arising from divine commandment. Humanitarians may simply
be compelled to prevent unnecessary human suffering in the future. In my
view, the sheer power of present generations to drastically affect future
quality of life, and the profound vulnerability of the future to the present,
give rise to moral responsibilities that ought to be incorporated in law.205
. At the same time, any doctrine that recognizes legal responsibility to
future generations must simultaneously recognize the right of the present
generation to pursue its own well-being. Recognizing the equal humanity
of present and future generations, the doctrine of intergenerational equity
allows for the maximization of welfare both now and in the future.
6. Preliminary conclusions - IGE as a legal framework for
international environmental law and policy
Kurt Lewin has written that "[t]here is nothing so practical as a good
theory. ' 20 6 Expanding upon the four criteria identified by Brown Weiss
(and discussed in Part II.3.a herein), I contend that intergenerational
equity is a "good theory" to guide environmental law and policy globally
for at least seven reasons.
First, the application of the doctrine of intergenerational equity would,
by definition, accomplish the biophysical imperative of environmental
protection. The doctrine requires conservation of both biodiversity
and environmental quality, and would result in an adequate quality
of life for both present and future generations of humans, as well as
generating substantial benefits for non-human members of the ecological
community.
Second, the doctrine of intergenerational equity is integrative; it
recognizes the legitimacy of multiple claims and provides guidance for
205. See Part 11.2, above.
206. Quoted in Morton Deutsch, "Co-operation and Competition" in Morton Deutsch & Peter T.
Coleman, eds., The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (San Francisco: Josey-
Bass, 2000) 21 at 31.
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resolving potential conflicts between these claims. In this respect, the
doctrine explicitly recognizes the rights of members of the developing
world to enjoy equal access to planetary resources, and the duty of the
developed world to fund developing nations in meeting their planetary
obligations to the future. This aspect of the doctrine should be further
developed to address scenarios in which satisfying urgent needs of members
of the present, particularly in developing nations, is simply inconsistent
with future welfare.
Third, subject to the developing world critique (which is primarily
a problem of ambiguity), the doctrine of intergenerational equity is
generally reasonable in terms of the sacrifices expected of present
generations. "Whatever may be true in the abstract about our duties
to future generations, we know that people are willing to make some
sacrifices for their descendants, but only within limits. Any practical
scheme of environmental protection must function within those limits. 207
By charting a middle ground between preservationism and the opulent
model, intergenerational equity meets this criterion.
Fourth, intergenerational equity is a "good theory" because it is rooted
in, or at least consistent with, major cultural and religious traditions. As
Professor Stone has observed, in the absence of effective enforcement
mechanisms, "cooperation in the international arena [is] all the more
dependent on a feeling of rightness than on force. '208 Thus, cultural
legitimacy across a wide range of societies is a significant advantage in any
doctrine of international environmental law. The philosophical and legal
roots of intergenerational equity in a diversity of cultures and religions
also make it possible to imagine a universal, but culturally diversified,
application of the doctrine. 09
Fifth, the doctrine of intergenerational equity is theoretically versatile.
Present generations' environmental rights and responsibilities towards.
future humans under the doctrine of intergenerational equity can co-exist
with responsibilities towards an intrinsically valuable natural world.
However, the responsibilities of present generations under the doctrine
of intergenerational equity are not contingent upon on the recognition of
the intrinsic value of nature. Thus, intergenerational equity is a viable
doctrine in our current, post-Rio anthropocentric theoretical framework,
but can also allow for the evolution of international environmental law
207. Farber, supra note 155 at 153.
208. Stone, The Gnat, supra note 179 at 242.
209. This is especially important given that, in the coming decades, developing countries in diverse
regions all over the world are likely to become more substantial contributors to environmental damage.
See Brown Weiss, "A Reply to Barresi", supra note 193 at 91-92.
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towards biocentrism. Indeed, Emmenegger and Tschentscher assert
that the emergence of intergenerational equity in international law may
actually assist in this process of evolution.210
Sixth, and of particular importance for our purposes, intergenerational
equity resolves the contest between rights and responsibilities in
international environmental law. It answers the concerns of cross-
cultural critics who oppose the hegemony of rights over responsibilities
in conceptualizations of human relations.211 Similarly, the doctrine of
intergenerational equity meets the more specific concerns, of ecological
ethicists who argue that the separation of rights from duties is a root cause
of environmental degradation.212 At the same time, the explicit recognition,
of rights (present and future, individual and group rights) should allay
the concerns of scholars such as Professor Saul, who have feared the
potentially oppressive character of legal responsibility.213
Finally, unlike the concept of sustainable development,2 14 the
doctrine of intergenerational equity is reasonably precise. The doctrine
as developed by Brown Weiss is systematic, content-rich, and therefore
eminently practical.
Thus, the doctrine of intergenerational equity has much to recommend
it as a framework for international environmental law and policy. Having
reviewed the theory of intergenerational equity, Part III will go on to
assess its current status in international law.
III. Status of intergenerational equity in international law
1. Introduction
Four preliminary observations may be made regarding the international
legal status of intergenerational equity. The first is that a number of the
components of the doctrine of intergenerational equity as developed by
Brown Weiss are already a part of international law. 215 Under the rubric of
planetary obligations, for example, a number of sub-species of the duty to
210. Susan Emmenegger & Axel Tschentscher, "Taking Nature's Rights Seriously: The Long Way to
Biocentrism in Environmental Law" (1994) VI:3 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 545 at 562-564.
211. See Morgan-Foster, "Third Generation Rights," supra note 2.
212. See Bosselmann, supra note 6 at 125.
213. See Saul, supra note 11.
214. The relationship between sustainable development and intergenerational equity will be discussed
in greater detail in Part III, below.
215. See Redgwell, supra note 115 at 124.
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conserve resources are set forth in various international treaties.216 The duty
to prevent disasters is related to the principle of state responsibility, 17 and
has been codified in conventions dealing with the transport of hazardous
substances.21 8 Similarly, the principle of Conservation of Options is codified
in the Convention on Biological Diversity and CITES,219 and Conservation
of Quality is reflected in numerous international treaties (and domestic
legislation) governing pollution.2 0
Second, although certain components of the doctrine of inter-
generational equity already have independent international legal force, the
doctrine as a coherent whole has not been incorporated into international
law. The doctrine as articulated by Brown Weiss has received some support
at the International Court of Justice, 221 in several legal experts' reports, and
in one notable soft law instrument, but has not been codified in any binding
treaty and has not reached the level of customary international law.
222
Third, a less specific concept of intergenerational equity, reflecting the
core premise that the present generation has an obligation to maintain an
adequate environment for future generations, has emerged in numerous
international law sources (discussed below). "[A] number of binding
and non-binding legal instruments make reference to present and future
generations, and there is emerging a general consensus regarding the need
to take the interests of future generations into account. ' 223 Fourth, the
doctrine of intergenerational equity is closely related to other emergent
norms of international environmental law, including, inter alia, sustainable
development, the right to environment, and Common but Differentiated
Responsibilities. 22
216. See Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 53, collecting treaties. See also
Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S., (1992) 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into
force 29 December 1993), online: <http://www.biodiv.org/convention/ articles.asp> [Biodiversity
Convention]. But see Redgwell, supra note 115 at 124 questioning the existence of a general duty to
conserve outside the specified obligations in particular treaties.
217. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 72.
218. Ibid. See also Basel Convention on the control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. (entered into force 5 May 1992).
219. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 216, CITES, supra note 100.
220. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (1972) 11 I.L.M. 1294; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, (2001) 40
I.L.M. 532; Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1302 U.N.T.S., (1979) 18
l.L.M. 1442; etc. Citations collected in J. William Futrell, "Multi-Lateral Environmental Agreements"
(2006) SL098 ALI-ABA I (WL).
221. See Part i.3 below.
222. Redgwell, supra note 115 at 115.
223. Ibid.
224. Ibid. at 127.
Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity 121
in Global Environmental Governance
2. Inclusion of IGE in international law instruments
As Brown Weiss notes, the principle of responsibility towards future
generations is not new in international law.225 Indeed, the Charter of the
United Nations identifies as one of the UN's purposes "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war. '226 Concern with the specifically
environmental interests of future generations is also reflected in a number
of early international law instruments including the International Whaling
Convention,227 the World Heritage Convention,28 and the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.229
Finally, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration introduced the notion of a general
environmental duty to future generations.23°
Since Stockholm, a number of international instruments have
recognized environmental responsibilities towards future generations.
Agenda 21, for example, exhorts governments to create sustainable
development strategies with the goal of allowing development while
"protecting the resource base and the environment for the benefit of future
generations"231 and acknowledges the interests of future generations in
four other provisions.232 Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development provides that "[t]he right to development must be
fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs
of present and future generations." Similarly, Principle 2(b) of the Forest
Principles2 33 provides that "[f]orest resources and forest lands should be
sustainably managed to meet the social, economic, ecological, cultural
and spiritual needs of present and future generations." Of particular note
for our purposes, the Aarhus Convention states in its Preamble, "every
person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her health
and well-being, and the duty, both individually and in association with
225. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 28.
226. Ibid.
227. See Whaling Convention, supra note 100; African Conservation Convention, supra note 100.
228. World Heritage Convention, supra note 100.
229. CITES, supra note 100.
230. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 67.
231. Agenda 21, supra note 62 at s. 8.7.
232. Ibid. at s. 8.31 (identifying the need to avoid passing on environmental burdens to future
generations as a "fundamental objective"); s. 33.3 (stating that assisting developing countries in
implementing Agenda 21 will serve the "common interests of...humankind in general, including
future generations"); s. 33.4 (noting that "inaction will narrow the choices of future generations"); and
s. 38.45 (acknowledging "the proposal to appoint a guardian for future generations").
233. United Nations, Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global
Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development ofA ll Types ofForests, A/
Conf. 151/26, Principle 2b, online: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 51/aconfl 5126-3annex3.
htm>.
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others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present
and future generations. 234
Language reflecting respect for the interests of future generations
may also be found in the Preambles of the 1992 Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents,235 the 1994 Convention
to Combat Desertification in Those countries Experiencing Drought
and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa,236  the 1996 Habitat
Agenda,237  the Convention on Biological Diversity,238  the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, 239 the UN General Assembly
234. Aarhus Convention, supra note 64.
235. Convention on the Transboundary Effects ofIndustrial Accidents, 17 March 1992, 2105 U.N.T.S.
460 (entered into force 19 April 2000) [Transboundary Convention]. The Preamble states that "[the
Parties are] mindful of the special importance, in the interest of present and future generations, of
protecting human beings and the environment against the effects of industrial accidents."
236. 17 June 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3, (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1328 (entered into force 26 December
1996). The Prologue states that "[the Parties] are determined to take appropriate action in combating
desertification and mitigating the effects of drought for the benefit of present and future generations."
237. Istanbul Declaration on Human Settlements, UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat
II) in Istanbul, Turkey, June 3-14, 1996, Annex 1, UN Doe. A/CONF 165/15 (1996) at para. 10: "In
order to sustain our global environment and improve the quality of living in our human settlements,
we commit ourselves to sustainable patterns of production, consumption, transportation and
settlements development; pollution prevention; respect for the carrying capacity of ecosystems; and
the preservation of opportunities for future generations."
238. Biodiversity Convention, supra note 216, Preamble: "Determined to conserve and sustainably
use biological diversity for the benefit of present and future generations...."
239. ienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human
Rights on 25 June 1993, A/CONF. 157/23, at para. 11: "The right to development should be fulfilled so
as to meet equitably the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations."
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Millennium Declaration,240 the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable
Development,24' and the Johannesburg Judge's Declaration.2 42
The only binding instrument to include responsibilities to future
generations in a substantive provision is Article 3(1) of the UnitedNations
Framework Convention on Climate Change which provides that:2
43
[p]arties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities...
Article 3 has a chapeau characterizing it as merely one of the principles by
which parties should be guided "in their actions to achieve the objectives
of the Convention and to implement its provisions". Professor Redgwell
explains that
the clear intention of this wording is to confine the legal consequences
of the principles articulated in Article 3 to the Framework Convention
on Climate Change, [however] it is doubtful whether Article 3 may be
'ring-fenced' in this manner. At the very least the Convention may be
viewed as beginning the process of defining the obligations of the present
generation to absorb the costs of reducing the risk of global warming for
future generations.
244
240. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, UN GAOR, 55th Sess., UN Doc.
A/RES/55/49 (2000) at para. 6, declaring "respect for nature" a fundamental value: "Prudence must be
shown in the management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts
of sustainable development. Only in this way can the immeasurable riches provided to us by nature
be preserved and passed on to our descendants"; also at para. 21: "We must spare no effort to free
all of humanity, and above all our children and grandchildren, from the threat of living on a planet
irredeemably spoilt by human activities, and whose resources would no longer be sufficient for their
needs."
241. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, Aug. 26-Sept. 4,
2002, Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, PP 1, 8, UN Doc. A/CONE 199/20
[Johannesburg Declaration] at para. 26, recognizing that "sustainable development requires a long-
term perspective" at para. 37: "we solemnly pledge to the peoples of the world and the generations that
will surely inherit this Earth that we are determined to ensure that our collective hope for sustainable
development is realized."
242. The Johannesburg Principles on the Role of Law and Sustainable Development (adopted at
the Global Judges Symposium, 18-20 August 2002), online: <http://www.pnuma.org/deramb/
publicaciones/GlobalJu.pdf>:
We emphasize that the fragile state of the global environment requires the Judiciary ...
to boldly and fearlessly implement and enforce applicable international and national laws
which.. .will assist in alleviating poverty and sustaining an enduring civilization, and
ensuring that the present generation will enjoy and improve the quality of life of all peoples,
while also ensuring that the inherent rights and interests of succeeding generations are not
compromised....
243. FCCC, supra note 94, Article 3.
244. Redgwell, supra note 115 at 117-118.
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The prevalence of references to the interests of future generations
in the preambles of numerous environmental conventions indicates that
some general notion of intergenerational equity has likely emerged at
least as a "guiding principle" in the interpretation of binding international
environmental law. 245 Taken together with the significant evidence in favour
of a customary international law norm of sustainable development,24 these
references support the emergence of a customary norm providing that the
present generation has an obligation to future generations to preserve an
environment adequate to meet their needs.
Thus, some progress has been made towards the recognition of a
form of intergenerational equity. Indeed, the ubiquity of references to
the environmental interests of future generations in treaties and soft law
instruments indicates that the notion of environmental responsibility
towards the future is becoming firmly entrenched in the international legal
order. With the exception of one notable soft law instrument, however,
international environmental law has not yet moved beyond this general
formulation to recognize the detailed and content-rich doctrine of
intergenerational equity articulated by Brown Weiss.
In In Fairness to Future Generations, Professor Brown Weiss
advocated for the promulgation of an international Declaration of Planetary
Obligations and Rights codifying the key elements of the doctrine of
intergenerational equity.247 She recognized that such an instrument would
constitute "soft law" but observed that it could lead to the conclusion
of binding agreements, and/or the formation of customary international
law.248 Shortly after the publication of In Fairness to Future Generations,
the Cousteau Society drafted and sopught support for an international Bill
of Rights for Future Generations. The document declares that "[fjuture
generations have a right to an uncontaminated and undamaged Earth" (Art.
1), and that "[e]ach generation, sharing in the estate and heritage of the
Earth, has a duty as trustee for future generations to prevent irreversible
245. See ibid. at 123.
246. See Atapattu, supra note 8.
247. Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 105.
248. In concert with the preparation of In Fairness to Future Generations, the United Nations
Advisory Committee on International Law, Common Patrimony and Intergenerational Equity adopted
the Goa Guidelines on Intergenerational Equity (Goa, 15 February, 1988). The Goa Guidelines
simply summarize and endorse the principles set out in In Fairness to Future Generations, and the
Guidelines were signed by the members of the Advisory Committee in their personal capacities. Thus,
though worthy of mention, the Goa Guidelines have little significance regarding the legal status of
intergenerational equity. Indeed, at para. 6 they re-state Brown Weiss's concession that planetary
rights and obligations "will become enforceable as they find expression in customary and conventional
international law." The Goa Guidelines are reproduced in In Fairness to Future Generations as
Appendix A. See Brown Weiss, Future Generations, supra note 73 at 293.
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and irreparable harm to life on Earth and to human freedom and dignity"
(Art. 2).249 In 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan formally accepted a
petition from the Cousteau Society in support of the Bill of Rights counting
nine million signatures from individuals around the globe.25°
Interestingly, the Cousteau Society's document, while linking rights
with duties, clearly favours the rights paradigm (as evidenced by its name).
One can speculate that, as a Western European-based organization, the
Society acted on a presumption that rights are the preeminent means for
securing important interests. Whatever the reasons for its existence, the
Cousteau Society's rights-based approach was turned upside down when,
in 1993, UNESCO partnered with the Society to further develop the
document. Although records of a 1994 experts meeting retain a focus on the
rights of future generations, 251 by 1997, the "rights" of future generations
had been replaced by the "needs and interests" of future generations.
Again, we can speculate that UNESCO's legal experts wished to avoid the
difficult theoretical problems associated with according rights to future
generations.252
The final version of the UNESCO General Assembly's Declaration
on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future
249. European Cetacean Bycatch Campaign, "Cousteau Society: A Bill of Rights for Future
Generations," online: <http://www.eurocbc.org/page72 .html>. The remaining articles in this brief
document provide as follows:
Article 3. It is, therefore, the paramount responsibility of each generation to maintain a
constantly vigilant and prudential assessment of technological disturbances and
modifications adversely affecting life on Earth, the balance ofnature, and the evolution
of mankind in order to protect the rights of future generations.
Article 4. All appropriate measures, including education, research, and legislation, shall be
taken to guarantee these rights and to ensure that they not be sacrificed for present
expediencies and conveniences.
Article 5. Governments, non-governmental organizations, and the individuals are urged,
therefore, imaginatively to implement these principles, as if in the very presence of
those future generations whose rights we seek to establish and perpetuate.
250. Brown Weiss, "A Reply to Barresi," supra note 197 at 97. See Cousteau Society, "Rights for
Future Generations," online: <http://www.cousteau.org/en/cousteau world/our programs/future
generations.phpsPlug = I >.
251. UNESCO, Director-General 1987-1999, "Discours de M. Federico Mayor, Directeur g6ndral de
l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour I',ducation, la science et la culture (UNESCO) A la cl6ture de
la r6union d'experts organisde par I'Institut tricontmiental de la d~mocratie parlementaire et des droits
de l'homme de l'Universitd de La Laguna sur les droits des g~n6rations futures (La Laguna, 26 fdvrier
1994) UNESCO Doc. DG/94/5, online: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0009/000963/096321F.
pdf>.
252. See C. Zanghi, "Pour la protection des gndrations futures" in Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Amicorum
Discipulorumque Liber Paix, Dgveloppement, Dgmocratie/Peace, Development, Democracy
(Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1998) at 1459-1478.
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Generations253 incorporates many of the key components of the doctrine of
intergenerational equity as articulated by Brown Weiss, but arrives at them
through the mechanism of present responsibility, rather than future rights.
Article 1 holds present generations responsible for safeguarding the needs
and interests of both present and future generations, thus addressing both
intra- and intergenerational equity. Article 2 mandates the preservation
of future generations' "freedom of choice," analogous to the notion of
Conservation of Options. Article 3 reflects the "obligation to endure,"
discussed in Part II, requiring the present generation to "strive to ensure
the maintenance and perpetuation of humankind with due respect for the
dignity of the human person...." Article 4 corresponds to Brown Weiss's
Conservation of Quality, providing that:
The present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future
generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by
human activity. Each generation inheriting the Earth.temporarily should
take care to use natural resources reasonably and ensure that life is not
prejudiced by harmful modifications of the ecosystems and that scientific
and technological progress in all fields does not harm life on Earth.
Article 5 mandates sustainable development, pollution prevention,
resource preservation, and the consideration of future generations in
the assessment of major projects. Article 6 requires the safeguarding of
the human genome, while Article 7 requires the preservation of cultural
diversity and cultural heritage. Article 8 addresses- the planetary rights
of the present generation, while steadfastly avoiding the actual language
of rights; it states that the present generation "may use the common
heritage of humankind.. .provided that this does not entail compromising
it irreversibly. 254
Finally, Article 12 takes a rather soft approach to implementation,
stating that the UN, states, and non-state actors, "should assume their full
responsibilities in promoting, in particular through education, training
and information, respect for the ideals laid down in this Declaration, and
encourage by all appropriate means their full recognition and effective
253. UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 29th session, Paris, 21 October to 12 November
1997, v.1 (UNESCO: 1998) at 69, online: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001102/110220e.
pdf>.
254. Articles 9 and 10 address future generations'right to peace and development respectively. Article
10 also provides that education "should be used to foster peace, justice, understanding, tolerance
and equality for the benefit of present and future generations." Article II provides that "present
generations should refrain from taking any action or measure which would have the effect of leading
to or perpetuating any form of discrimination for future generations." "
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application." Earlier references to the formation of an organ to facilitate
implementation of the Declaration255 were removed from the final draft.
Although the UNESCO Declaration is not binding law, UNESCO
includes 191 Member States (and six Associate Members), a significant
proportion of the international community. 256 Thus, the Declaration
provides some evidence of emerging opinio juris concerning present
environmental duties towards future generations. Perhaps more
importantly, the document provides a useful template for the distillation
of the doctrine developed over several hundred pages in In Fairness to
Future Generations into a workable international Declaration.
3. IGE at the ICJ
Both the doctrine of intergenerational equity as articulated by Brown
Weiss, and the more general principle of environmental obligation towards
future generations have received significant support at the ICJ. Judge
Weeramantry has been the leading proponent of intergenerational equity
at the ICJ, but the majority of the Court has also endorsed the principle
that present generations have a responsibility to preserve an adequate
environment for future generations.
In Denmark v. Norway,25 7 concerning maritime delimitation between
Greenland and Jan Mayen, Judge Weeramantry's separate opinion
undertook an exhaustive analysis of equity in international law, including
consideration of principles of intergenerational equity. Judge Weeramantry
noted specifically that diverse legal traditions around the world have
recognized principles of intergenerational equity:
Asearch of global traditions of equity in this fashion can yieldperspectives
of far-reaching importance in developing the law of the sea. Among
such perspectives deeply ingrained therein, which international law
has not yet tapped, are concepts of a higher trust of earth resources, an
equitable use thereof which extends inter-temporally, the "sui generis"
255. See UNESCO, Projet de Declaration sur la Sauvegarde des Generations Futures, 151 st Sess.,
Annexe, Point 3.5.2, UNESCO Doc. 151EX/18 (1997) at art. 13(3), online: <http://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0010/001 064/106455F.pdf>.
256. See UNESCO, "The Organization," online: "Member States and Associate State Members"
<http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URLID=3329&URLDO=DOTOPIC& URLSECTION=201.
html>.
257. Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Denmark v. Norway), [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 38 [Denmark v. Norway]. For helpful discussions of this
case, as well as the 1995 Nuclear Tests Case, infra note 260, and the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, supra note 105, see Brown weiss, "A Reply to Barresi," supra note 195 at 93-95; Greg
Maggio & Owen J. Lynch, "Inter-Generational Equity in Case Law" in Human Rights, Environment,
and Economic Development: Existing and Emerging Standards in International Law and Global
Society (1997), online: Center for International Environmental Law, <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/
olpaper3.htmal>.
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status accorded to such planetary resources as land, lakes and rivers,
the concept of wise stewardship thereof, and their conservation for the
benefit of future generations. Their potential for the development of the
law of the sea is self-evident.25
Justice Weeramantry cited In Fairness to Future Generations in support
of this proposition, and also "for the fact that intergenerational fairness
can be addressed under principles of equity in accordance with a long
tradition in international law of using equitable principles to achieve a just
result." '259
Two years after Denmark v. Norway, Justice Weeramantry took the
opportunity to develop his analysis of intergenerational equity in the
Nuclear Tests case of 1995.260 He devoted an entire section of his dissenting
opinion to the "Concept of Intergenerational Rights," and characterized
the principle of intergenerational equity as "an important and rapidly
developing principle of contemporary environmental law."2 61  Most
notably, Justice Weeramantry addressed the role of international tribunals
and states in protecting intergenerational rights as follows:
In a matter of which it is duly seised, this Court must regard itself as a
trustee of [the] rights [of future generations] in the sense that a domestic
court is a trustee of the interests of an infant unable to speak for itself...
New Zealand's complaint that its rights are affected does not relate only
to the rights of people presently in existence. The rights of the people
of New Zealand include the rights of unborn posterity. Those are rights
which a nation is entitled, and indeed obliged, to protect (emphasis
added).262
In the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, 63 both the majority
opinion and Justice Weeramantry recognized the interests of future
generations. The majority opinion noted that "[t]he destructive power of
258. Denmark v. Norway: Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, [1993] I.C.J. Rep. 211 at 274,
para. 235. See also 276, para. 240, recognizing that diverse global legal traditions incorporate equitable
principles including "[n]otions of.. .harmony of human activity with the environment, respect for the
rights of future generations, and the custody of earth resources with the standard of due diligence
expected of a trustee" though these principles "ha[d] yet to be woven into the fabric of international
law."
259. Ibid. at 277, para. 240, n. I.
260. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the Court's
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) Case, Order of 22
September 1995, [1995] I.C.J. 288 at 317, online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/inzfr/
inzfrframe.htm> [Nuclear Tests Case].
261. Ibid. at 341.
262. Ibid. For the majority decision, see online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ icases/inzfr/inzfr_
iorders/inzfr iorder 19951022.pdf>.
263. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 105.
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nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or time. They have
the potential to destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the
planet ... the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger to future
generations."264 The Court went beyond mere recognition of potential
future impacts-explicitly stating that it would actually give consideration
to the possible impacts on future generations in interpreting applicable
law.
in order correctly to apply to the present case the Charter law on the
use of force and the law applicable in armed conflict, in particular
humanitarian law, it is imperative for the Court to take account of the
unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in particular... their
ability to cause damage to generations to come.2 65
The majority stated that the environment "represents the living space, the
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations
unborn." 266
The majority of the ICJ reiterated this intergenerational definition of
the environment in the subsequent case of Hungary v. Slovakia.267 In that
case, Judge Weeramantry once again endorsed "the principle of trusteeship
of earth resources, [and] the principle of intergenerational rights. 268
4. IGE in international experts 'reports
The doctrine of intergenerational equity as developed by Brown Weiss
has received substantial support from the international legal community.
The 1995 Legal Experts Report for the United Nations Commission on
Sustainable Development devoted a section of its analysis to "equity,"
stating that equity "has been invoked as a principle of international law"
and that it includes both intergenerational equity and intra-generational
equity.269 The report adopted Brown Weiss's definition of intergenerational
equity, citing In Fairness to Future Generations, and specifically adopted
264. Ibid. at 243-44.
265. Ibid. at 244 [emphasis added].
266. Ibid. at 241.
267. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), [1997] I.C.J. Rep.
7, online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihs ijudgment 970925_frame.
htn>.
268. Case Concerning the Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Separate Opinion
of Vice-President Weeramantry, [1997] I.C.J. Rep. 88 at 110, online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket/ihs/ihsjudgement/ihs-ijudgment_970925_frame. htm>. Judge Weeramantry included these
two concepts in a list of "principles of traditional systems" that should be incorporated into modem
environmental law.
269. United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, Report of the Expert Group Meeting
on Identification ofPrinciples ofInternational Lawfor Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland,
26-28 September 1995 at para. 38.
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Brown Weiss's three principles of intergenerational equity: conservation of
quality, options, and access. 270 It asserted that "[i]ntergenerational equity
is well-known to international law"'271 and cited environmental treaties
recognizing duties to future generations, as well as the ICJ's decision in
the 1995 Nuclear Test Case.27
2
The 1996 UNEP Legal Experts Report similarly endorsed
intergenerational equity, stating that "[a]n integrated intergenerational
equity approach should constitute an underlying part of any sustainable
development strategy in international law. 273 The travauxpreparatoires for
the 1997 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on "Responsibility
and Liability under International Law for Environmental Damage"
characterized the concept ofintergenerational equity as "paramount" among
emerging principles of international environmental law. 274 Most recently,
in a 2005 report on national strategies for sustainable development, the
OECD characterized intergenerational equity as "a fundamental principle
of sustainable development. 275
5. Intergenerational equity and other principles of international
environmental law
Redgwell asserts that although intergenerational equity has not reached
the level of customary international law,
a process of 'creeping intergenerationalisation' may be observed
emanating from two processes. First, there is the 'spillover effect' of
preambular recognition of future generations in the interpretation and
application of substantive treaty provisions. Second, other substantive
principles of international environmental law embody an intertemporal
dimension.2 7
6
In Redgwell's view, there are five principles of international environmental
law that have particular relevance to the doctrine of intergenerational equity.
These are sustainable development, the common heritage of humankind,
270. Ibid. at para. 42.
271. Ibid. at para. 46.
272. Ibid. at paras. 46-47.
273. See U.N. Environment Programme, Final Report of the Expert Group Workshop on International
Environmental Law Aiming at Sustainable Development, UNEP/IELJWS/3/2 (1996) 13-14, para. 30,
44-45.
274. The Environment, Travauxpriparatoires, (1997) 67:1 Annuaire de l'Institutde Droit International
312.
275. OECD, National Strategies for Sustainable Development: Good Practices in OECD Countries,
SG/SD(2005)6 at para. 16 reviewed in UNDSD, Expert Group Meeting on Reviewing National
Sustainable Development Strategies New York, 10-11 October 2005 UNDSD/EGM/NSDS/2005/CRP.
9, online: <http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/ nsds/egm/crp_9.pdf>.
276. Redgwell, supra note 115 at 126.
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the principle of custodianship or stewardship, the precautionary principle,
and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. 7 For the
purposes of this article, I will focus on the relationship of intergenerational
equity with sustainable development, common but differentiated
responsibilities, and the right to environment.
a. IGE and sustainable development
Defined by the Brundtland Report 278 as "development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs,2 79 sustainable development is the preeminent
organizing principle in the discourse of environmental decision-making
worldwide.2 11 Put another way, "sustainable development has emerged
as an international paradigm for the new millennium in reconciling and
integrating the goals of economic development, social development, and
environmental protection."2 '' A number of commentators have argued
that the principle of sustainable development has now reached the level of
customary international law. 282
The close relationship between sustainable development and a
general concept of intergenerational equity283-the notion that the present
generation's use of natural resources must be limited to safeguard the
ecological needs of future generations-is self-evident and has been widely
277. Ibid. at 127.
278. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1987) [Brundtland Report].
279. Ibid at 43.
280. See Atapattu, supra note 8 at 70: "almost all recent international environmental instruments
make specific reference to [sustainable development] and states seem to have accepted it as a norm
which should be taken into account when making decisions on the environment."
281. Ved P. Nanda, "Sustainable Development, International Trade and the Doha Agenda for
Development" (2005) 8 Chapman L. Rev. 53 at 54.
282. See Varamon Ramangkura, "Thai Shrimp, Sea Turtles, Mangrove Forests and the WTO:
Innovative Environmental Protection under the International Trade Regime" (2003) 15 Geo. Int'l
Envtl. L. Rev. 677 at 682: "the last twenty years have brought the acceptance of the principle of
sustainable development as a rule of customary international law"; Hari M. Osofsky, "Defining
Sustainable Development After Earth Summit 2002" (2003) 26 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. Ill
at 112, noting "international recognition of sustainable development as part of customary international
law"; Nicholas A. Robinson, "'Coming Round the Bend'- Global Policy Trends and Initiatives" (2005)
American Law Institute, SK046 ALI-ABA 179 (WL) at 261: "there are plentiful indications...of that
degree of 'general recognition among states of a certain practice as obligatory' to give the principle of
sustainable development the nature of customary law."
283. See, e.g., Sato, supra note 78 at 504: "Insofar as its primary purpose is to balance the survival
concerns of the future with the needs of the present, the philosophy of sustainable development is
highly concerned with intergenerational ethics: mapping out the interdependent relationships,
obligations, and expectations of past, present, and future generations"; cf Sharon Beder, "Costing the
Earth: Equity, Sustainable Development and Environmental Economics" (2000) 4 N.Z. J. Env'tl L.
227, at 227: "The central ethical principle behind sustainable development is equity and particularly
intergenerational equity."
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acknowledged. 2 4 In contrast, the detailed doctrine of intergenerational
equity developed by Brown Weiss is not reflected in the sustainable
development paradigm. This migration of intergenerational environmental
concern from the highly specific doctrine of intergenerational equity to
the sustainable development model is problematic for at least two related
reasons.
First, the concept of sustainable development is notoriously vague.285
Environmental groups interpret a norm of sustainable development as
requiring a high level of environmental protection, while industry views
sustainable development as encouraging the exploitation of natural
resources (with environmental mitigation) so as to effectuate the right to
development. 286 "So frequently adopted by so many groups with wildly
varying agendas-from the Sierra Club to the coal industry-the term
might seem to be well on its way to becoming meaningless.""2 7 The
difficulty is that the concept of sustainable development lacks a coherent
and sufficiently rigid legal framework to contain and define its content.
Like an amoeba, the concept can morph this way and that, drawn in
turn by public relations considerations, project financing, or regulatory
approval.288
Second, in addition to its substantive ambiguity, the principle of
sustainable development also lacks normative specificity. Thus, even if
we could pin down the meaning of the term, the nature and degree of
the obligation to pursue "sustainable development" is undefined. Crucial
284. Indeed, in the author's view, a general principle of intergenerational equity is wholly integrated'
with the principle of sustainable development such that evidence for the emergence of a customary.
international norm of sustainable development is simultaneously evidence of the emergence of this
broad principle of intergenerational equity, and vice versa.
285. But see Alhaji B.M. Marong, "From Rio to Johannesburg: Reflections on the Role of International
Legal Norms in Sustainable Development" (2003) 16 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 21 at 44, noting that
"many scholars argue that sustainable development is too vague a concept and too ambiguous in
meaning for it to have normative status."
286. Patricia Nelson, "An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism: Finding a Path
to Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector" (2004) 32 Denv, J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 615 at 615.
287. Ibid.
288. Consider, for example how Ismail Serageldin of the IBRD interprets sustainable development as
permitting the ongoing exploitation of fossil fuels:
We are able to set aside a foolish yet still prevalent view ... that sustainability requires
leaving to the next generation exactly the same amount and composition of natural capital
as we found ourselves, by substituting a more promising concept of giving them the same,
if not more, opportunities than we found ourselves ... This immediately opens the door
for substituting one form of capital for another ... [lI]t is indeed most worthwhile to reduce
some natural capital (for example, reducing the amount of oil in the ground) to invest in
increasing human capital (for example, by educating girls)....
Ismail Serageldin, Sustainability and the Wealth of Nations: First Steps in an Ongoing Journey
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996) at 7.
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questions regarding the length of the time horizon, the content of the duties
of use flowing from the environmental interests of the future, and the nature
of the legal relationship between present and future generations remain
unanswered. More particularly, the principle of sustainable development
says nothing about the respective rights and responsibilities of present and
future generations; it fails to mobilize the legal and moral power inherent
in these constructs. Finally, the principle of sustainable development does
not include any explicit implementation mechanisms.
In contrast to the principle of sustainable development (and the
general concept of intergenerational equity reflected therein), the doctrine
of intergenerational equity as developed by Brown Weiss is detailed
and specific, employs the language of rights and responsibilities, and
incorporates specific implementation mechanisms. The doctrine of IGE
is therefore a superior framework for environmental decision-making
around the globe.
b. IGE and common but differentiated responsibilities
The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities ("CDR")
recognizes that all nations of the world share responsibility for protecting
the global environment, but that identical obligations should not be
imposed upon developing and developed nations. Instead, the measures
required of developing and developed countries should be differentiated in
accordance with their respective historical contributions to the problem, as
well as their technical and financial ability to respond. 89 CDR approaches
have been adopted in a number of important multilateral environmental
treaties.290 As Maggio explains:
The notion of common but differentiated responsibilities is closely
linked to intergenerational equity; CDR predicates responsibility for
environmental protection on both past consumption of natural resources
and present capacity to shoulder the burden of maintaining and improving
environmental quality...
From the standpoint of developing countries, the impact of "common
but differentiated responsibilities is to transform the normative character
of financial and technical resource transfers between industrialized
and developing countries from the realm of "aid" to the category of
289. See Mayeda, supra note 171 at 33, 50; Stone, "Differentiated Responsibilities", supra note 94 at
276-277.
290. See Stone, "Differentiated Responsibilities", supra note 94 at 276, n.I (collecting references).
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international legal obligation. 291
Intergenerational equity as articulated by Brown Weiss expressly includes
a requirement on the part of wealthier nations to assist developing countries
to meet their conservation obligations. 292
The doctrine of intergenerational equity as articulated by Brown Weiss
also addresses the concerns embodied in the notion of Environmental
Justice,2 93 through the requirement that members of the present generation
- the beneficiary class of the planetary trust - assist all members of the
class to access planetary resources. 294 Given that planetary resources
clearly include clean air and water, the doctrine.of intergenerational equity
would also appear to require that pollution burdens be equitably allocated
within the present generation.
c. IGE and the right to environment
The right to environment is clearly analogous to the "Planetary Rights"
component of the doctrine of intergenerational equity, at least in its
individual aspect. The difficulty with the right to environment as it is
currently emerging in international law is that it does not address the
consequences of such a rightfor the right holder.295 It is clear that a right
to environment would impose correlative duties on the state, but not at all
clear that the right holder would have an obligation to protect the substance
of the right. Under a pure rights-based system, the right holder could
exercise her right to environment until and unless her conduct impinged
upon the rights of other existing humans. Thus, conduct causing little or no
discernible environmental harm in the present, but having the potential to
291. G.F. Maggio, "Inter/Intra-Generational Equity: Current Applications under International Law
for Promoting the Sustainable Development of Natural Resources" (1997) 4 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 161 at
206-207.
292. Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, supra note 73 at 45. See contra Mayeda, supra
note 171, who views intergenerational equity as an inadequate response to global inequalities and
poisits a combination of CDR and the Precautionary Principle as an alternative to intergenerational
equity.
293. Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations, supra note 73 at 45.
294. Ibid. at 27-28.
295. Note, however, that at least one important international formulation of the right to environment
does include recognition of. future-oriented limits. See Review of Further Developments in Fields
with Which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned, Human Rights and the Environment: Final
Report Prepared by Mrs. Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th
Sess., Agenda Item 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (1994) ("[a]ll persons have the right to an
environment adequate to meet equitably the needs of present generations and that does not impair the
rights of future generations to meet equitably their needs").
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cause severe environmental harm in the future,2 96 may not be in violation
of the right to environment in its current formulation. The doctrine of
intergenerational equity recognizes the right to environment, but balances
this right with environmental responsibility to the future.
6. Intergenerational equity at the domestic level
a. IGE in domestic case law
At least one domestic court has relied on the concept of intergenerational
equity in deciding an environmental dispute. In Oposa v. Factoran,297 a
group of Philippine children brought an action to quash timber licensing
-agreements, on behalf of themselves and future generations. The court
supported the children's standing to sue on behalf of future generations,
stating that:
[t]heir personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony
of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm
and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to
the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.29
Although the Oposa decision is likely too isolated to contribute to the legal
status of intergenerational equity, the case provides a useful example, of
296. Take, for example, the phenomenon of "groundwater mining," or the unsustainable extraction of
groundwater from an aquifer. The present generation may be able to continue to withdraw sufficient
drinking water resources for decades or longer, but may ultimately exhaust the aquifer with disastrous
results to future generations. See generally Eric Ryan Potyondy "Sustaining the Unsustainable:
Development of the Denver Basin Aquifers" (2005) 9 U. Deny. Water L. Rev. 121; Ronald Keiser &
Frank F. Skillem, "Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden Threat of Aquifer Depletion in
Texas" (2001) 32 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 249.
297. 224 SCRA 792 (1993), 33 I.L.M. 173.
298. Ibid. at 802-803.
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the implementation of intergenerational equity in judicial environmental
decision-making.299
b. Future generations in domestic constitutions
The domestic Constitutions of twenty-two countries explicitly recognize
the environmental interests of future generations.3°° At least sixteen of
these provisions were promulgated since 1990, suggesting the evolutibn
of intergenerational equity as an emergent principle of customary
international law since that time. Some domestic constitutional provisions
explicitly recognize environmental "rights" of future generations, while
others provide for State duties or obligations towards future generations.310
Germany's constitution provides, for example, that "the State protects...
with responsibility to future generations the natural foundations of life. 302
In a section entitled "National Goals and Directive Principles," the
constitution of Papua New Guinea expressly calls for "wise use to be made
of natural resources and the environment.. .in the interests of development
and in trust for future generations.30 3
Interestingly, and in keeping with the theory of intergenerational
equity as articulated by Brown Weiss, some domestic constitutions
recognize non-State duties towards future generations. Article 225 of
Brazil's constitution, for example, states that "the Government and the
community have a duty to defend and preserve the environment for... future
generations. 3 °1 4 The Republic of Vanuatu has taken a unique approach,
providing in its constitution that every person has the duty "to himself and
his descendants and to others.. .to safeguard the natural wealth, natural
299. But see Dante B. Gatmaytan, "The Illusion of Intergenerational Equity: Oposa v. Factoran
as Pyirhic Victory" (2003) 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 457 (arguing that Oposa added nothing to
Philippine law, which already recognized the environmental rights of future generations, and noting
that it did not result in increased environmental protection, since the Supreme Court cancelled no
TLAs, and the petitioners abandoned the case once it was remanded for trial).
300. Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Brazil, East Timor, Eritrea, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guyana,
Iran, Malawi, Micronesia, Namibia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, South Africa, Uganda,
Vanuatu, and Zambia. See Marcello Mollo et al., Environmental Human Rights Report: Human Rights
and the Environment - Materials for the 61st Session of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, Geneva, March 14-April 22, 2005 (Oakland, California: Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund,
2005), A-1.
301. For Constitutions see ibid. at 86 (Albania and Andorra), 88 (Brazil), 93 (Eritrea), 94 (Georgia
and Germany), 95 (Ghana and Guyana), 98 (Malawi), 99 (Namibia), 102 (Qatar), 107 (Uganda).
302. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), art. 20a. cited in Mollo, supra note 300
at 94.
303.Mollo, ibid. at 101.
304. Ibid. at 88 [emphasis added]. See also Article 6(1) Constitution of East Timor cited in Mollo,
ibid. at 93 ("All have the right to a humane, healthy and ecologically balanced environment and the
duty to protect and improve it for the benefit of the future generations").
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resources and environment in the interests of the present generation and of
future generations." 305
National constitutional provisions may be evidence of general
principles of law common to major legal systems.306 In the realm of human
rights specifically, provisions of national constitutions enacted pursuant to
a perceived international legal obligation may also constitute state practice
giving rise to customary international law.307 Constitutional recognition of
the environmental rights of future generations and/or present obligations
towards them remains the exception rather than the rule. However, the
prevalence of intergenerational concern in recently enacted constitutions
arguably supports the emergence of a broad principle of environmental
responsibility towards future generations as a principle of customary
international law. 308
c. Domestic IGE implementation mechanisms
In 2001, the Israeli Knesset passed a law establishing a Commission for
Future Generations. 39 The Commission is an "organ of the parliament"
with a mandate to review legislation and prevent the introduction of laws
that have the potential to negatively effect the "needs and rights of future
generations".31 The Commission also has the authority to introduce
bills for the benefit of future generations.311 The Israeli Commission for
Future Generations considers issues bearing on the environment and
natural resources, but also broader social issues bearing on the future
including health, education, and technology.312 Finland's parliamentary
"Committee for the Future" similarly considers future implications of both
environmental and non-environmental decision-making.3"3
In 1995, France created a"Council for the Rights of Future Generations",
appointed by the President. However, Jacques Cousteau, its first chairman,
resigned in response to France's resumption of nuclear testing in the Pacific.
The Committee has apparently been relatively inactive in the intervening
305. Mollo, ibid. at 108.
306. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, (June 26, 1945), art. 27(c).
307. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 701, cmt. a (1987) at § 701, reporter's note I
cited in Lee, supra note 71 at 313-316.
308. See Lee, supra note 71 at 339.





313. See World Future Council Initiative, "Writings: Local Councils" online: <http://www.
worldfuturecouncil.orgi>.
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years. 14 Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Beligium, Britain,
Sweden, Jamaica, Barbados, Dominican Republic all have governmental
organs responsible for implementing sustainable development, and/or
considering the broader future implications of governmental action.3"5
These initiatives likely constitute state action, perhaps motivated by
opiniojuris, so as to provide evidence of a rule of customary international
law. However, the number of states that have adopted implementation
measures to effectuate environmental obligations towards future generations
is not high enough to justify a claim of generalized state practice.
7. Conclusion on the legal status of intergenerational equity
Redgewell concludes that "at best, intergenerational equity may be said
to constitute a 'guiding principle' in the application of substantive norms,
including existing treaty obligations, under international law."'3 16 In my
view, this conclusion is overly cautious. It is true that the detailed doctrine
of intergenerational equity has not been incorporated into international law,
and that the broader principle of environmental obligation towards future
generations (whether framed in the language of sustainable development or
intergenerational equity) suffers from significant ambiguity. Nevertheless,
given the repeated recognition of environmental obligations towards future
generations in the preambles of environmental conventions, in soft law
instruments, and in international jurisprudence, there is ample evidence of
the emergence of a principle of customary international law providing that
the present generation owes a duty to preserve an environment in which
future generations' have the ability to meet their needs.317
However, in the end, the question of the legal status of intergenerational
equity will certainly be overshadowed by the issue of implementation. If
states adopt intergenerational equity as a guiding principle in the formation
of environmental policy, then the doctrine will make a significant impact
on inter-temporal environmental quality regardless of its legal status.
314. Ibid.
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317. It must be conceded, however, that neither intergenerational equity nor sustainable development
will meet their full potential without the development of a detailed and coherent legal framework.
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function, it is of critical importance to develop a clear definition")). I have argued that the doctrine
of intergenerational equity as articulated by Brown Weiss in In Future Generations is an appropriate
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Conclusion
The state of the world today invites a question basic to the human future:
by what set ofconsensual rules for collective human behavior, interacting
on a finite planet, can this World be governed to safeguard its stability
and continuity?318
I have argued (in common with many other scholars) that rights and
responsibilities are two dominant governing principles in human societies,
and further that the relationship between these two paradigms is hotly
contested internationally. Even within the environmental field, ecological
ethicists and environmental advocates have disagreed as to the utility and
validity of the rights paradigm as it relates to environmental protection.
I have further argued that the doctrine of intergenerational equity, as
developed by Edith Brown Weiss, effectively integrates the paradigms
of environmental rights and responsibility. Moreover, the doctrine of
intergenerational equity provides a coherent and practicable set of legal
rules to govern human conduct in the area of environment.
Since the publication of In Fairness to Future Generations, the
notion of environmental responsibility toward future generations has been
expressed in international law through "soft law" instruments, preambles
to environmental treaties, and state practice in the form of domestic
constitutional recognition. However, to a large extent the concept of
intergenerational environmental responsibility has been co-opted and
diluted through the hegemonic paradigm of sustainable development. In
my view, the relative ascendance of sustainable development over the
doctrine of intergenerational equity has resulted in at least two significant
losses for the international community.
First, as argued above, the disproportionate emphasis on the amorphous
principle of sustainable development has allowed the international
community to neglect the difficult but crucial details of intergenerational
environmental justice. In sum, having excised the language of rights and
responsibility, the principle of sustainable development fails to provide
adequate protection to the environmental interests of future generations.
Second, the failureto seriously grapplewiththerespective environmental
rights and obligations of present and future generations has been a missed
opportunity for cooperative international environmental governance.
Rather than merely eschewing these paradigmatic constructs, as does the
principle of sustainable development, the doctrine of intergenerational
318. Lynton K. Caldwell, "Is World Law an Emerging Reality? Environmental Law in a Transnational
World" (1999) 10 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 227 at 229.
140 The Dalhousie Law Journal
equity seeks to engage, reconcile, and integrate the powerful language of
rights and responsibility. Thus, the doctrine of intergenerational equity
presents a unique opportunity to integrate and operationalize foundational
cultural, political, and legal premises from diverse cultures.
Nevertheless, it seems clear that sustainable development will likely
remain the dominant paradigm for international environmental decision-
making for the foreseeable future. Given the continued dissatisfaction
with the ambiguity of the concept, however, there may be some possibility
.of reinvigorating the doctrine of intergenerational equity by importing it
into the law (and policy) of sustainable development. More specifically, I
would assert that the doctrine of intergenerational equity should be viewed
as the legal mechanism, or framework, for achieving the goal of sustainable
development.
For the reasons discussed in Parts Two and Three, intergenerational
equity constitutes an appropriate and effective legal framework for
sustainable development. In particular, the doctrine of intergenerational
equity is environmentally protective, integrative, reasonable in terms of
the sacrifices expected of present generations, cross-culturally appropriate,
theoretically versatile, and consistent with the discourses of both rights
and responsibility. It is also sufficiently detailed and robust that it would
dispel the existing ambiguity of the concept of sustainable development
and provide viable avenues for implementation.
Although it is not necessary to adopt every particular of the doctrine
as developed by Brown Weiss, intergenerational equity should at least
be understood to include the three Planetary Obligations and Rights
(Options, Quality, and Access), the five correlative duties of use,3 19 the
intra-generational equity component, independent representation for
future generations, the application of intertemporal responsibility beyond
national borders, and an explicitly defined time horizon. The latter should
extend into the remote future for impacts that could cause catastrophic
devastation.In the end, the doctrine of intergenerational equity has the potential to
play a significant role in assisting human societies to govern our conduct
in a way that preserves the awesome ecological legacy of Planet Earth for
the future. In my view, the enormous value of that project is self-evident.
319. See Part II.3.c., supra.
